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Rethinking the Constitutional Criminal
Procedure of Juvenile Transfer Hearings:
Apprendi, Adult Punishment,
and Adult Process
JENNY E. CARROLL*

This Article makes valuable new contributions to the burgeoning scholarly discourse
on Apprendi v. New Jersey-a landmark decision that celebrates its tenth anniversary
this year. It builds on the Author's experience as a public defender, during which she
pioneered the surprising but straightforward argument that under Apprendi, findings
that justify transferring a juvenile to adult court must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Apprendi requires that any fact authorizing a sentence higher than
the otherwise applicable statutory maximum must be found by a jury using a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard. This tenet applies directly to juvenile transfer hearings,
which rely on a consideration of facts to determine whether a juvenile should face trial
and sentence in adult court. The facts that serve as a basisfor transfer result in exposure
to a higher sentence than could be imposed if the offender remained in juvenile court.
Despite Apprendi's readily apparentapplication, juvenile courts have refused to apply
Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings. This Article presents this argument and
critiques the reasoning of courts that have refused to apply Apprendi in this context. It
then explores the theoretical underpinnings of courts' reluctance to apply Apprendi,
filling a scholarly void that exists at the intersection of Apprendi and the juvenile
justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
Every day in the United States, children are tried and sentenced as
adults. These children's convictions are the result of a system where
children are transformed, via legal fiction, into adults despite the fact that
they have not reached the age of majority. In the process, children are
moved from the juvenile justice system to the adult court system for the
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purpose of a criminal trial.' This process is unique in the area of criminal
law as it removes the child from the relatively protective confines of the
juvenile justice system, and forces him or her to stand trial in and face
the consequences of judicial and penal systems that are designed to
address the crimes of adults.
Other legal prohibitions based on age do not adopt similar legal
fictions. Especially mature thirteen-year-olds cannot petition for the right
to drink alcohol, drive a car, or vote. They cannot buy tobacco or
pornography. They are not forced to register for the draft or leave their
junior high schools. They cannot serve on juries. In most states they
cannot marry or sign binding contracts or even get a credit card without
their parents' permission. 3 Such legal prohibitions exist in no small part
out of a recognition that juveniles lack the level of maturity necessary to
assume the responsibilities that accompany each right or privilege. But
states are more than happy to reward a juvenile's criminal
precociousness with an adult prosecution and sentence. States have
sought to transfer juveniles to adult court not only for the sort of highprofile crimes that end up in the national media spotlight, but for more
i. Such proceedings are identified by various names: transfer, waiver, decline, or certification.
Regardless of the name used to identify the proceeding, the underlying goal-to move a minor from
juvenile to adult court-remains the same.
2. Questions regarding the constitutionality of such systems of transfer, and the resulting
sentences, have recently sparked judicial interest. The Supreme Court has accepted certiorari on two
Florida cases in which juveniles received life sentences without the possibility of parole after they were
transferred to the adult court system. See Sullivan v. State, 987 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2oo8),
cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (May 4, 2009) (No. 08-7621); Graham v. State, 982 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2oo8), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (May 4, 2009) (No. 08-742); see also Petition for Writ of
Certiorari, Sullivan v. State, No. o8-762 1, 2008 WL 6031406, at *2, *9-3o, *39 (U.S. Dec. 4, 2oo8). The
cases question whether or not the sentences violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment. See Sullivan, 987 SO. 2d at 83; Graham, 982 So. 2d at 46-49. While the cases do
not challenge the transfer of the juveniles to the adult court system, they do represent a continuing
trend of questioning the constitutional appropriateness of assigning adult roles and punishments to
juvenile offenders. See, e.g., Sullivan, 987 SO. 2d at 83; Graham, 982 So. 2d at 46-49.
3. For a more complete list on restrictions of juveniles, see Brief of Juvenile Law Ctr. et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 7-1, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633),
2004 WL

1660637,

at *7-11.

4. The Supreme Court acknowledged the law's recognition of the immaturity of juveniles and its
effect on legal concepts in Roper, 543 U.S. at 569, holding that defendants could not be executed for
crimes committed as juveniles in no small part because they lack maturity and suffered an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility. There are methods by which juveniles may petition for
"emancipation" whereby they can become "adults" in the eyes of the law after establishing maturity
and their ability to provide for themselves. See Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes:
Emancipating Children in Modem Times, 25 U. Mica. J.L. REFORM 239, 240 (1992) (discussing the
process of statutory emancipation whereby "minors attain legal adulthood before reaching the age of
majority"). But even after emancipation, the juvenile is still precluded from enjoying all the "benefits"
of adulthood. They cannot, for example, drink, gamble, or patronize adult-only establishments. Id. at
241 (noting that while emancipated minors enjoy certain benefits from achieving the legal status of
adulthood, such benefits do not encompass all aspects which accompany actual, biological adulthood).
5. The first weeks of 2009 witnessed the shocking story of an eleven-year-old boy accused of
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mundane crimes as well. Such transfers are an increasing trend across the
country. 6
Statutes defining the parameters of juvenile transfer proceedings
vary from state to state, but every state has adopted some method to
remove children accused of crimes from the juvenile justice system,
whether it be judicial waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction, legislative
exclusion of offenses from juvenile court jurisdiction, or prosecutorial
choice of forum between concurrent jurisdictions. ' Likewise, the
constitutional, evidentiary, and procedural protections juveniles receive
in these proceedings vary from state to state.8 Despite the enormous
consequences that flow from the decision to transfer a juvenile offender
to an adult court, the Supreme Court has given surprisingly little
guidance on the procedures required to remove children from the
protections of juvenile court, except to hold that a hearing, no matter
how informal, must occur prior to the transfer, and that the court must
make certain findings to justify the transfer.' In many jurisdictions, this
laissez faire attitude toward the particulars of transfer renders the child's
removal from the juvenile court system a fait accompli once the state
petitions for the transfer. 0

fatally shooting his father's pregnant girlfriend; prosecutors have vowed to try the child as an adult.
See Jill King Greenwood, DA: Boy Who Shot Father's Pregnant Girlfriend Was Jealous, PITSBURGH
TRIB.-REV., Feb. 23, 2oo9, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/news/breaking/
s_.613048.html; see also John Dougherty, Prosecutors Say Boy, 8, Methodically Shot His Father, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. II, 2oo8, at Ai9 (discussing prosecutors' and law enforcement officials' hopes to have
eight-year-old boy accused of killing his father and another man transferred to the adult court system);
Patrick T. Murphy, Op-Ed., Convicted at 14, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 2001, at A25 (discussing transfer and
convictions as adults of two fourteen-year-old Florida boys).
6. See Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Plea Bargaining in Juvenile Court, 23 CRIM. JUST. 61, 61 (2oo8)
(noting the trend of transferring juvenile crimes to the adult court system). See generally Barry C. Feld,
Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems' Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME & JUST. 189 (1998)
(examining statutory changes in juvenile transfer proceedings and the effect such changes have had on
increased numbers of juveniles being tried as adults).
7. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN CRIMINAL COURT
AND CASE DISPOSIIUONS, REP. No. 170, at ri, 64-89 (1995) (summarizing juvenile court transfer
legislation); Eric Fritsch & Craig Hemmens, Juvenile Waiver in the United States 1979-1995: A
Comparison and Analysis of State Waiver Statutes, 46 Juv. & FAM. Cr. J. 17, 23-33 (1995) (offering a
state-by-state comparison of juvenile transfer methods).

8. See infra Part I.C.
9. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62 (1966).
i o. See generally Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion and Youth Justice, 31 CRIME &JusT. 495, 52122 (2oo4) (discussing growing trend to facilitate transfer of juveniles to adult court); Martha June

Rossither, Comment, Transferring Children to Adult Criminal Court: How to Best Protect Our
Children and Society, 27 J. JUv. L. 123, 129-30 (2oo6) (discussing trend fueled by fears of juvenile
violence to make transfer process easier for prosecutors despite lack of evidence supporting its
deterrent effect); Daniel E. Traver, Comment, The Wrong Answer to a Serious Problem: A Story of
School Shootings, Politics and Automatic Transfer, 31 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 281, 293 (2ooo) (discussing
Cook County's efforts to ensure transfer of juvenile offenders); JOLANTA JUSZKIEWICz, BUILDING
BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME: IS JUSTICE SERVED? (2008), available at http://
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This reality is disconcerting given the impact of transfer-a
transferred child faces the full force of the adult conviction and
punishment with none of the protections normally afforded a minor." A
young but active line of Supreme Court cases, beginning with Apprendi
v. New Jersey," may change all that. The Apprendi decision, which
celebrates its tenth anniversary this coming Supreme Court Term, has
already had a tremendous effect on criminal justice at the state and
federal levels. Apprendi and its progeny-Ring v. Arizona," Blakely v.
Washington,

'4

United

States

v.

Booker,

'1

and

Cunningham

v.

California'6 -have reshaped the constitutional law of criminal procedure
and garnered a tremendous amount of scholarly attention. 7 As one
federal judge recently noted, "Apprendi is fast becoming one of the
most-cited Supreme Court cases ever."' 8 Courts and commentators have
largely failed to appreciate, however, that the logic of Apprendi compels
a fundamental rethinking of the constitutionally required procedures for
transferring a juvenile offender to adult court.' 9
www.buildingblocksforyouth.orglycat/ycat.html (noting growing trend in states to insure ready transfer
particularly of children of color and underprivileged children).
ii. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 557 (noting that transfer can bring hefty differences in sentencing and
deprives juveniles of protections provided by the juvenile court system); see also Barry C. Feld, The
Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentencing Enhancements Based on
Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. IIII,
1215 (2003) ("Because judicial waiver is a form of sentencing decision that represents a choice
between the punitive sentences in criminal courts and the shorter, nominally rehabilitative dispositions
available to juvenile courts, it increases the maximum penalties that juveniles face."); Juan Alberto
Arteaga, Note, Juvenile (In)Justice: Congressional Attempts to Abrogate the Procedural Rights of
Juvenile Defendants, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1051, 1o61 (2002) (articulating the increased sentencing and
collateral effects of transfer on juveniles).
12. 530 U.S. 466 (2ooo).
13. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
14. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
15.543 U.S. 220 (2oo5).
16. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).

17.See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87 IOWA
L. REV. 465 (2oo1); Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact Finding and Sentencing Enhancements in a World of
Guilty Pleas, 11o YALE L.J. 1097 (2001); Joseph L. Hoffman, Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the
Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255 (2001); Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, go GEO. L.J.
387 (2001); Benjamin J. Priester, Constitutional Formalism and the Meaning of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 281 (2001); Steven A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History and Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 243 (2001); Jeffrey Standen, The End of an Era of Sentencing
Guidelines: Apprendi v. New Jersey, 87 IOWA L. REV. 775 (2001). A Westlaw search of articles using
Apprendi in the title yields Lo6 documents, or roughly ten articles per year since the publication of the
Supreme Court's ruling. The search was conducted in the "Journals & Law Reviews Database" on
November 7, 2009. Likewise, a recent Westlaw search of articles citing Apprendi yields over 1700
documents, or roughly 17o articles per year since the decision. This search was conducted using the
"citing references" feature, and was restricted by "Law reviews."
18. United States v. Kandirakis, 441 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 n.15 (D. Mass. 2oo6).
19. See Feld, supra note ii, at 1221-27 (contending that Apprendi is not appropriately applied to
juvenile transfer hearings); Kevin R. Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum: Policy and Constitutional

S80o

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 6 1: 175

Put simply, the Apprendi holding requires that any fact, other than a
prior conviction, that exposes a defendant to a sentence in excess of the
statutory maximum that would otherwise apply must be found by a jury,
not a judge, and must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.2 The
holding in Apprendi rests on two constitutional principles: the Sixth
Amendment's right to trial by jury in most criminal cases and the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal cases.] The decision to transfer a child
removes him or her from the juvenile court system and places him or her
in an adult court system with higher sentences and increased collateral
consequences. In short, a transfer to an adult court system has the effect
of increasing the child's sentence beyond the otherwise authorized
statutory maximum. The findings that justify such a transfer expose the
juvenile to higher statutory maximum sentences than he or she would
face if tried in the court of primary jurisdiction, the juvenile court system.
Therefore, Apprendi would seem to require such findings to be proven to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Yet nearly every court to consider this
issue has refused to apply Apprendi's promise to juvenile transfer
decisions.22 Every day, judges (not juries) continue to weigh facts, using a
mere preponderance-of-the-evidence standard or less, to determine
whether juveniles should be removed from juvenile court and transferred
to the adult court system." These courts' decisions not to apply Apprendi
to juvenile transfer proceedings are contrary to a plain reading of the
Apprendi case line, and ignore the true impact and frequently articulated

Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. IoS2, 1121 (2oo5) (arguing that it is unlikely that courts
would find Apprendi applicable to juvenile transfer hearings). But see Daniel M. Vannella, Note, Let
the Jury Do the Waive: How Apprendi v. New Jersey Applies to Juvenile Transfer Proceedings, 48 Wm.
& MARY L. REv. 723, 751-70 (2oo6) (noting that most courts have declined to apply Apprendi to
juvenile transfer hearings and arguing that Apprendi should be applied to juvenile transfer hearings,
though pointing out there may be practical difficulties in the application).
20. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2ooo).
2 1. Id. at 476-77.
22. Two courts have held the Apprendi case line applicable to the sentencing of juveniles as
adults. First, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that Apprendi requires that decisions to transfer
juveniles to adult court be made by a jury using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. See
Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d 781, 789 (Mass. 2001), overruled on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1201 n.28 (Mass. 2005). More recently, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals held that determinations of amenability-a postconviction assessment which serves
as a basis for imposing adult sentences on juveniles-are subject to the protections of Apprendi. See
State v. Rudy B., 2oo9 NMCA 104, 216 P.3d 8io (N.M. Ct. App. 2oo9) (overruling State v. Gonzales,
24 P-3d 776 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001)), cert. granted, No. 31,909 (N.M. Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://
www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2oog/ogca-104.pdf.
23. See Vannella, supra note 19, at 739-40 (noting that twenty states only require a probable
cause finding for transfer, seven states only require a preponderance of the evidence standard for
transfer, and no state requires a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard).
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goal of transfer proceedings-to subject the juvenile offender to the
harsher sentencing scheme only available in the adult justice system.24
There are several potential explanations for courts' reluctance to
heed Apprendi in this context. One is that doing so would introduce
juries into the juvenile justice system. The Supreme Court has long held
that a juvenile who remains in juvenile court is not constitutionally
entitled to have a jury assess his or her culpability." Instead, judges in
most jurisdictions weigh children's guilt and mete out appropriate
punishments based on their findings of culpability. 6 Courts and scholars
justify this abandonment of the Sixth Amendment's most basic tenet by
clinging to an ideal of a nurturing and reformative juvenile justice system
that embraces the possibility of rehabilitation for young offenders."
Whatever the merits of this view, the general aversion to juries in
juvenile court is wholly inappropriate in the context of a transfer hearing,
where the very issue is whether the juvenile is to be transplanted from
that ostensibly nurturing system into an adult court with adult
punishments.
Another explanation is that Apprendi forces courts to confront some
uncomfortable realities about juvenile transfer. By mandating that "the
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect,"" Apprendi prevents
courts from swaddling themselves in the euphemistic fiction that transfer
decisions are merely jurisdictional or non-adjudicatory determinations.
Where the effect of a particular finding is to impose a sentence higher
than is otherwise authorized, that finding must be treated as an element
of the offense for Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment purposes.29 More
troubling is the fact that in the case of juvenile transfer decisions, this
element is fundamentally based on the identity of the accused, as defined
by the transferring court. The transfer decision alters the child's identity
into one that makes him or her simultaneously more culpable and less
redeemable-that of an adult. Yet premising criminal culpability on the
accused's identity does not sit well with the American criminal justice
system.30 In the context of the juvenile transfer hearing, the court is not
only making an assessment of the juvenile's culpability based on identity,
24. See Arteaga, supra note i i, at 1051-52 (discussing federal movement to implement "severely
retributive reforms" through, among others means, increased juvenile transfer rates); Feld, supra note
ii, at 1215; Rossither, supra note io, at 123, 129-30 (discussing transfer as a means of shifting concern
from rehabilitation of juveniles to retribution and deterrence).
25. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,545 (i971) (plurality opinion).
26. See Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful
Convictions?, 34 N. Ky. L. REV. 257, 303 &n.369 (2oo7) (noting that only eleven states grant juveniles a
statutory right to a jury, the remaining rely on judges to assess guilt).
27. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 538-4o, 547 (plurality opinion).
28. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2ooo).
29. Id,
30. See infra Part IV.
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but on an identity that the court has created -that the child is an adult
and warrants an adult's punishment. In other words, the court is basing
the higher sentence on the child's condition of being a child who no
longer merits juvenile court protection-an irredeemable child. Courts'
refusal to apply Apprendi may be a product of cognitive dissonance that
prevents them from recognizing these unpleasant realities and, instead,
leads them to evade Apprendi's obvious relevance to transfer decisions.
This Article argues that Apprendi and its progeny should and must
apply to juvenile transfer proceedings. Part I of the Article examines the
constitutional requirements within the juvenile justice system generally.
It chronicles the roots of the modem juvenile justice system in the
reformist movement and the system's evolution into one which requires
fewer constitutional safeguards in exchange for the promise of a greater
possibility of rehabilitating the offender. It then specifically focuses on
juvenile transfer hearings, which currently require minimal constitutional
protections and, in most jurisdictions, consist of a hearing before a judge
using a standard less than beyond a reasonable doubt. In these hearings,
procedural protections provided by evidentiary rules and the right
against self-incrimination are suspended or modified. Only a minimum of
process, as articulated by the Court in the Kent v. United States3 ' decision,
is offered. As a result of the minimal procedural protections, including
the low standard of proof required, judges rarely refuse a prosecutor's
request for transfer.
Part IL focuses on the Court's analyses in Apprendi, Ring, Blakely,
Booker, and Cunningham and the Court's conclusion that findings by a
jury using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard are required in order to
justify imposition of a criminal sentence in excess of the statutory
maximum that would apply. Each of these decisions reiterated the
Court's original holding in Apprendi that, regardless of the label assigned
to the fact by the Court, any fact which increases the defendant's
sentence beyond the otherwise authorized statutory maximum is an
element of the offense that must comply with the requirements of the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Part III applies Apprendi's analysis to juvenile transfer proceedings.
It urges that because the effect of transfer proceedings is to extend the
juvenile's sentence beyond that which he or she would have received in
the juvenile court, Apprendi requires the findings justifying transfer to be
made by a jury under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. This Part
also examines arguments courts have relied on in refusing to apply
Apprendi to juvenile transfer proceedings-that transfer hearings merely
determine jurisdiction and do not adjudicate guilt, and that juvenile court

31. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
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is different and so the procedural protections mandated by Apprendi are
inapplicable or inappropriate. The Article explains why such arguments
do not withstand scrutiny. Instead, they appear to be efforts by the courts
to relabel what, under Apprendi, must be treated as elements of the
offenses.
Part IV considers the theoretical basis for courts' reluctance to apply
Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings. It examines the courts' struggles
to recognize the true effect of transfer proceedings, namely, to increase
the child's punishment and to criminalize the condition of being an
especially unruly child incapable of reform. Part V addresses outstanding
questions raised by attempting to apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer
proceedings, including how these protections might be implemented in
practice. The Article concludes that Apprendi's procedural requirements
are applicable to juvenile transfer proceedings and must be applied.

I. OLD SCHOOL: TWENTIETH-CENTURY STANDARDS
FOR JUVENILE TRANSFER HEARINGS
This Part summarizes the traditional standards for juvenile transfer
hearings. Section A provides a short history of juvenile justice systems.
Section B describes the Supreme Court decisions that deal explicitly with
the constitutional requirements for juvenile transfer hearings, beginning
with the Court's decision in Kent v. United States.3 2 Section C summarizes
the different procedures that states have adopted for juvenile transfer
hearings.
A. A BRIEF HISTORY OF JUVENILE COURT
The history of juvenile courts is well documented and analyzed.
Juvenile court systems arose in response to changes in social attitudes
about childhood and delinquency.33 Inherent in these new social attitudes
was a notion that children required supervision and socialization in order
to become productive members of society and that, with proper
supervision, even a delinquent child could be "redeemed." 34 In response
to these changing social attitudes, court systems were created to
adjudicate juvenile offenders." These systems rejected the jurisprudence
and procedural formalities of the adult court system. " Instead,
Id.
33. See
32.

FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW AND
CRIMINOLOGY 25-41 (1964). See generally ANTHONY M. PLArr, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF
DELINQUENCY (2d ed. 1977); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT

(1978).
34. See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The
Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. Io83, 1o98-I1o (1991).
35. See id.
EXPERIMENT

36. See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES
IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 212-25 (i98o); RYERSON, supra note 33, at 38-39; Ainsworth, supra note 34.
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proceedings were conducted in private and focused as much on the
child's social history as the particulars of his or her alleged offense.37 The
courts reasoned that procedural protections and constitutional rights
akin to those found in the adult court system had no place in a juvenile
court system that sought not only to discipline the child, but also to
reform and save him or her."' Matters involving juvenile offenders were
treated as "domestic" issues to be addressed by those who were best able
to determine the needs of the child." Constitutional "technicalities" had
no place in this realm, and juries were excluded from the proceedings.40
Instead social workers, probation officers, and judges investigated and
decided both the source of and the solution for the child's delinquency.4
The "sentences" imposed by these courts varied greatly, but always
articulated a goal of addressing the child's character and lifestyle, and
always terminated at the age of majority (usually either eighteen or
twenty-one).4 2
The Supreme Court's ruling in In re Gault began to shift the focus of
the juvenile court from an assessment of the child's needs to a
determination of his or her criminal liability as a prerequisite for
sentencing.43 Gault rejected the informality of juvenile court systems,
noting that "unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated, is a
poor substitute for principle and procedure."" Gault, therefore, held that
the Constitution entitled juvenile defendants to notice, assistance of
counsel during all stages of the proceedings, privileges against selfincrimination, and the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.45
Three years later, the majority in In re Winship expanded the procedural
protections applicable to juvenile court to include the Fourteenth
Amendment's beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.46
One year later, however, the Court pulled back from the trend of
expanding protections for juvenile offenders. Despite the Court's
warnings in Gault that lack of procedure would lead to arbitrary
application of the law, a plurality in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania47 refused
to extend the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to juveniles in the
juvenile court system.4' The plurality reasoned that Gault and subsequent
37. See Ainsworth, supra note 34, at ioo-oi.
38. See id.; Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909).
39. See ROTHMAN, supra note 36, at 212-25; Ainsworth, supra note 34, at io100-0.
40. See Ainsworth, supra note 34, at i ioo-o.
41. See Ainsworth, supra note 34, at iloo-ri; Feld, supra note ii, at 1139-40.
42. See supra note 41.
43. 387 U.S. 1, 13-18 (1967).
44. Id. at 18.

45. Id. at 33-34,36-41, 45-57.
46. 397 U.S. 358, 361-68 (197o).
47. 403 U.S. 528 ([971).
48. Id. at 545-51 (plurality opinion).
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cases that extended procedural protections to juvenile court did so in the
interest of promoting "fundamental fairness" and accurate fact-finding.
These goals, the McKeiver plurality reasoned, were just as likely to be
realized using a judge or a jury. 0 The McKeiver plurality did not undo
the procedural protections of Gault and Winship." Nonetheless, the
McKeiver plurality evoked the pre-Gault image of the juvenile court
system as presided over by a sympathetic, paternalistic judge who had
the child's best interests at heart. It rejected the notion that juvenile
delinquents required a jury as protection from government oppression
and arbitrary judges." In his dissent, Justice Douglas warned that the
plurality's return to the pre-Gault image of the juvenile court seriously
underestimated the jury's potential role in assuring the fairness of the
process." Justice Douglas argued that in painting such a rosy image of
the juvenile system, the plurality turned a blind eye to the fact that
juvenile offenders in that system faced confinement until the age of
majority, and so should be "entitled to the same procedural protection[s]
as an adult."54
B.

KENT V. UNITED STA TES: THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS

Despite the creation of juvenile court systems designed to reform
and save the errant child, not all juveniles were considered appropriate
candidates for the system. In Kent v. United States, the Court considered
the case of Morris Kent, Jr. Kent was sixteen years old and charged with
housebreaking, robbery, and rape." As a minor, he was subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court unless
that court, after "full investigation," decided to waive jurisdiction and
remit him for trial in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. 6 Kent was no stranger to juvenile court." Beginning at age
fourteen, he was placed on probation and began to accumulate a "Social
Service" file chronicling his criminal activity.'8 When in the case at issue,
he was arrested and confessed-after a lengthy police interrogation-to
committing a rape after breaking into a home to rob it, the possibility
that the juvenile court might waive jurisdiction and remit Kent to trial in
49. Id. at 543.
50. Id. at 543-51.
51. Id. at 531-34.
52. Id. at 539-40, 543-51.
53. Id. at 562-63, app. at 563 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Feld, supra note ii, at i145 (citing DONALD
A. DRIPPS, ABoUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE I07 (2oo3)).
54. Id. at 559.

55.
56.
57.
58.

383 U.S. 541, 543 (1966).
Id. at 547.
See id. at 543.
Id.
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the district court was very real." His counsel made known "his intention
to oppose waiver" before charges were even filed.t While Kent was held
at a receiving home awaiting either an arraignment or a determination of
probable cause, Kent's counsel had him examined by two psychiatrists
and a psychologist. 6' He then requested a hearing on the question of
waiver, and filed a copy of the affidavit of a psychiatrist certifying that
Kent was "'a victim of severe psychopathology' and recommending
hospitalization." 6 He argued that waiver to adult court was inappropriate
because Kent could receive treatment in a hospital through juvenile
court.6' Kent's attorney noted that juvenile court, unlike the adult court
system, had an articulated goal of rehabilitation.64 Kent's suitability for
rehabilitation therefore counseled against transfer. In addition, Kent's
counsel requested access to Kent's social service file, which the juvenile
court judge would undoubtedly consider in determining whether to
retain or waive jurisdiction."
The juvenile court judge "did not rule on the motions," hold a
hearing, or confer with Kent, his parents, or his counsel.0 Instead, the
judge entered an order reciting the requirements of the statute, and
stating that after a "full investigation" transfer was appropriate.6 The
judge entered no findings, nor did he provide a basis for his decision.69
The U.S. Supreme Court held that while the District of Columbia's
Juvenile Court Act may grant substantial latitude in determining
whether to retain jurisdiction, such "latitude is not complete." 70 The
juvenile court was still required to comply with the "basic requirements
of due process and fairness" as well as hold a "full investigation." 7' The
Court in Kent did not require this investigation to conform to the
requirements of a criminal trial, or even an administrative hearing. In
fact, Kent offered little guidance as to the type of hearing the court
should conduct, what facts it should consider, and what weight it should
give those facts. 73 The Court did require that at a minimum the juvenile
2

59.
6o.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 543-44 (citing D.C.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 544-45.
Id. at 545.
Id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 546.
Id.
Id.
Id.

CODE

§ I1-914 (1961)).

70. Id. at 552-53 (referring to D.C. CODE § 11-914 (1961)).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 562.

73. See id. at 557 (holding that the minor was entitled to a hearing without elaborating further).
Despite the Court's effort to avoid a list of appropriate factors to be considered, in its appendix the
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court allow the minor to participate, be aware of the proceedings, and
receive representation.74 The Court also concluded that such protections
must exist at the waiver hearing, and could not be cured subsequently by
protections afforded by the adult court system.7" While the Court
declined to explicitly extend Kent all the constitutional guarantees that
would be applicable in an adult criminal court, it explicitly acknowledged
that procedural protections were critical in a waiver hearing, because the
outcome of the hearing would affect Kent's potential sentence.7
The Court's decision in In re Gault" came a year after Kent. With its
holding in Gault, the Court made it clear that procedural guarantees for
juvenile offenders, such as those identified in Kent, were of constitutional
dimension and could not be withheld simply because a proceeding
occurred in juvenile court, as opposed to adult court.'" In 1975, the
Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones continued to assign constitutionally
significant procedural guarantees to the juvenile transfer process when it
applied the Double Jeopardy Clause to transfer hearings, requiring
prosecutors to choose the forum of prosecution before a hearing on the
merits of the offender's guilt."
C.

DEFINING BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS AND FAIRNESS IN
TRANSFER HEARINGS

Since the rulings in Gault, Kent, and Breed, state and federal
legislatures have set up a range of standards and procedures for making
transfer determinations. Most jurisdictions conclude that transfer
hearings do not require adherence to strict rules of evidence or
procedure present in trial proceedings. For example, the majority of
Court provided a list of "determinative facts" that it determined were appropriate to be considered in
deciding whether to waive or retain jurisdiction. Id. app. at 565-68. These eight factors have come to
be known as the Kent factors and are frequently used as a guideline in transfer proceedings. See, e.g.,
State v. Avery, 649 S.E.2d 102, io8 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007); Hidalgo v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746, 754 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1999).

74. Id. at 557.
75. Id. at 563-64 (reasoning that the juvenile court possessed a unique expertise to determine the
appropriateness of waiver that the district court lacked).
76. Id. at 557 ("In these circumstances, considering particularly that decision as to waiver of
jurisdiction and transfer of the matter to the District Court was potentially as important to [Kent] as
the difference between five years' confinement and a death sentence, we conclude that, as a condition
to a valid waiver order, [Kent] was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social
records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a
statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision.").
77. 387 U.S. I (1967).
78. Id. at 13; see Irene Merker Rosenberg, Gault Turns 4o: Reflections on Ambiguity,44 CuIM. L.
BULL. 330, 334-37 (2oo8); see also Harris v. Procunier, 498 F.2d 576, 581 n.x (9th Cir. 1974)
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting) ("At the time of the Kent decision, there was some doubt that the
requirement of counsel it announced was of constitutional dimension.... In re Gault. . .clarified the
Kent decision....").
79. 421 U.S. 519,541 (1975).
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jurisdictions have held that evidentiary rules prohibiting the use of
hearsay do not apply in transfer proceedings,8 with only Alaska,8 '
Connecticut," and South Dakota applying evidence rules to transfer
So. Courts in many states have explicitly held that evidentiary rules, specifically hearsay rules, do
not apply in juvenile transfer proceedings. See, e.g., O.M. v. State, 595 So. 2d 514,516 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991); In re Appeal in Pima County, 546 P.2d 23, 25 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Superior Court,
173 Cal. Rptr. 788, 793-96 (Ct. App. ig8); Drotzur v. State, 372 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1979); In re R.B., 448 S.E.2d 69o, 691 (Ga. 1994); In re Dinson, 574 P.2d 119, 123-24 (Haw. 1978),
overruled on othergrounds by State v. Sanders, 76 P.3d 569, 571 (Haw. 2003); State v. Christensen, 6o3
P.2d 586, 589 (Idaho 1979); People v. Taylor, 391 N.E.2d 366, 372 (Ill. 1979); Clemons v. State, 317
N.E.2d 859, 863-67 (Ind. 1974); State v. Wright, 456 N.W.2d 661, 664 (!owa 1990); Hazell v. State, 277
A.2d 639, 644 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1971); Commonwealth v. Watson, 447 N.E.2d I182, 1185 (Mass.
1983); People v. Williams, 314 N.W.2d 769, 771-72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); In re Welfare of T.D.S., 289
N.W.2d 137, 140-41 (Minn. 1980); In re Three Minors, 684 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Nev. 1984) (noting,
however, that hearsay evidence could not serve as the sole basis for transfer), disapproved on other
grounds by In re William S., 132 P.2d 1o15, 1021 & n.23 (Nev. 2oo6); State ex rel A.T., 584 A.2d 861,
863 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991); State ex rel B.G., 589 A.2d 637, 64o (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); People v. Giaccio, 96 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917-18 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Blore v. C.N., 301 N.W.2d 636, 64041 (N.D. 1981); State v. Carmichael, 298 N.E.2d 568, 571-73 (Ohio 1973); C.G.H. v. State, 58o P.2d
523, 527 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978); In re Fox, 625 P.2d 163, 165 (Or. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Strickland,
532 S.W.2d 912, 919-20 (Tenn. 1975); G.R.L. v. State, 581 S.W.2d 536, 538 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); State
v. D.M.Z., 830 P.2d 314, 316-17 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); In re Harbert, 538 P.ad 1212, 1217 (Wash. 1975)
(en banc); State v. Piche, 442 P.2d 632, 635 (Wash. 1968); In re E.H., 276 S.E.2d 557, 565 (W. Va.
1981); P.A.K. v. State, 350 N.W.2d 677, 685 (Wis. 1984). But see W.T.J. v. State, 665 So. 2d 1019, 1023
(Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (disallowing hearsay if it is the sole basis of the transfer); In re Stephfon W.,
442 S.E.2d 717, 721 (W. Va. 1994) (holding that hearsay evidence cannot serve as the sole basis for
transfer); Comer v. Tom A.M., 403 S.E.2d 182, 188 (W. Va. 1991) (same). Federal courts have
followed suit in some jurisdictions, including the U.S. Virgin Islands, see Virgin Islands ex rel A.M., 34
F-3d 153, 160-62 (3d Cir. 1994), Texas, see United States v. Doe, 871 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (5th Cir.
1989), the District of Columbia, see United States v. H.S., 717 F. Supp. 911, 913 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd
on other grounds by In re Sealed Case (Juvenile Transfer), 893 F.2d 363, 370 (1990), and Oregon, see
United States v. E.K., 471 F. Supp. 924, 929-30, 935 (D. Or. 1979).
81. See P.H. v. State, 504 P.2d 837, 84 2- 43 (Alaska 1972), superseded by statute on other grounds,
ALAsKA STAT. § 47.Io.o8o(b)(i) (1977), as stated in In re F.S., 586 P.2d 6o7, 61o (Alaska 1978). In PH.,
the court held that strict rules of evidence do apply to juvenile "waiver" hearing (Alaska's term for
"transfer" hearings), noting in particular that a determination of probable cause at such a hearing
could not be based on hearsay testimony. Id. at 842-43. However, the PH. court also noted that
background information was not considered within the definition of hearsay and, therefore, was
admissible because it did not speak to the offense itself. Id.
82. See In re Jose M., 62o A.2d 804, 8io (Conn. App. Ct. 1993). In Jose M., the court noted that
the Connecticut legislature had actually amended the statute governing transfer hearings to
incorporate all procedural protections governing probable cause hearings, including the rules of
evidence, for persons charged with crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment. Id.; see CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §H4 6b-127, 54-46a (West 2009). The court therefore concluded that hearsay was not
admissible in transfer hearings unless otherwise allowed by the rules of evidence. Jose M., 62o A.2d at
8to.
83. See State v. Milk, 519 N.W.2d 313, 315 (S.D. 1994). The Milk court held that a juvenile
transfer hearing was not a dispositional hearing and, therefore, the rules of evidence did strictly apply,
including those that prohibited hearsay. Id. The court based this conclusion on two South Dakota
statutes. Id. The first, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-9-14(7) (1987), indicated that the rules of evidence do
not apply at juvenile dispositional hearings. Milk, 519 N.W.2d at 315. The second, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 26-7A-I(17) (1992), defined a dispositional hearing as one occurring after an adjudication of guilt.
Milk, 519 N.W.2d at 315. As transfer hearings occurred prior to an adjudication, the court concluded
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proceedings. In other jurisdictions, while the courts may not have
specifically abandoned the evidentiary rules, admission of hearsay
evidence is not reversible error. In justifying their decisions not to apply
evidentiary rules to transfer hearings, most courts have concluded that
such protections are not necessary because the hearings are essentially
dispositional in nature, as opposed to adjudicatory, or are mere
determinations of jurisdiction; however, they often acknowledge that
evidence used to justify transfer might be inadmissible in a determination
of the delinquency. Other courts have justified relaxed evidentiary
standards in juvenile transfer proceedings by pointing to juvenile courts'
generally looser policies and protections.
In addition to relaxed evidentiary standards, several jurisdictions
have refused to apply bedrock principles of constitutional criminal
procedure to juvenile transfer hearings. Arkansas,8 Hawaii,s8 Idaho,
Indiana, '

Iowa, " New

Hampshire, " New

Jersey, ' Texas, '

and

that such hearings were not exempt from evidentiary rules. Id.
84. In Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New Mexico, and Rhode Island, the courts failed to reverse
transfers following admission of hearsay evidence against a minor offender. See Templeton v. State,
447 P.2d 158, 163-64 (Kan. 1968); Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 592, 596 (Ky. 1972); In re
Stevenson, 538 P.2d 5, 7 (Mont. 1975); In re Doe, 556 P.2d 1176, 1179 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); State v.
Mastracchio, 605 A.2d 489,492-94 (R.I. 1992). In Mastracchio, 605 A.2d at 493, the court even allowed
admission of the juvenile's father's criminal record because the court believed it was relevant to the
determination of the child's potential for rehabilitation.
85. See In re Three Minors, 684 P.2d at I124 (concluding that formal evidentiary rules were not
necessary in juvenile court since "[t]ransfer hearings are essentially dispositional in nature and not
adjudicatory"), disapproved on other grounds by In re William S, 132 P.3d at io2 & n.23; In re
P.WN, 301 N.W.2d at 640 (holding that evidentiary rules in transfer proceedings would
inappropriately limit the information the court could consider; acknowledging that evidence that is
inadmissible at an adjudicatory hearing may be used to justify transfer).
86. See, e.g., In re Welfare of T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 139-40 (Minn. i98o) (holding that in an
informal setting such as juvenile court, formal evidentiary rules did not seem appropriate).
87. See United States v. Parker, 956 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1992) (rejecting juvenile's claim that
admission at transfer hearing of transcript from prior hearing denied juvenile's right to confront
witnesses).
88. See In re Dinson, 574 P.2d 119, 123 (Haw. 1978) (indicating that transfer proceedings are akin
to dispositional hearings therefore mooting the need for "the full criminal procedural protections"),
overruled on other grounds by State v. Sanders, 76 P.3d 569, 571 (Haw. 2003); see also HAw. REV. STAT.
§ 571-22 (2oo6) (setting out which factors may be considered in deciding whether jurisdiction should
be waived in juvenile transfer proceedings).
89. See Wolf v. State, 583 P.2d toiI, 1o5 (Idaho 1978) (holding that a defendant had no right at a
transfer hearing to cross-examine a prosecutor who provided testimony that there was probable cause
to believe that the defendant had committed murder).
go. See Spikes v. State, 46o N.E.2d 954, 958 (Ind. 1984) (concluding that hearsay was properly
admitted in a juvenile transfer hearing because the juvenile had no right to cross-examine during a
transfer hearing which was more akin to a probable cause hearing than an adjudicatory proceeding),
vacated on other grounds by Spikes v. Indiana, 471 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1985)-

91. See State v. Wright, 456 N.W.2d 661, 664-65 (Iowa 199o) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
right to confrontation does not apply to transfer hearings but instead only to criminal prosecutions).
92. See In re Eduardo L., 621 A.2d 923, 930 (N.H. 1993) (holding that evidence presented in
transfer hearings must only have indicia of trustworthiness and that juveniles are not afforded the
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Washington" have all held that the Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation (or the equivalent) does not apply in juvenile transfer
hearings. Indiana, Texas,7 and Wisconsin have held that the Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination is inapplicable, allowing
confessions procured in violation of the juvenile's Fifth Amendment
rights to be admitted in transfer hearings. Likewise, until November
2008, Nevada allowed transfer to the adult court system based on
evidence obtained in violation of the juvenile's Fifth Amendment
rights." In justifying these rulings, courts have emphasized that, despite
the protections afforded by the Supreme Court in Kent, Gault, and
Breed, transfer hearings are not adjudications of guilt or innocence and,
therefore, full constitutional protections are not necessary.o

II.

THE APPRENDI REVOLUTION

While the state courts have struggled to develop the appropriate
constitutional standards for transfer hearings, the Supreme Court has
remained silent since Kent as to what, if any, procedural protections are
required in juvenile transfer hearings. A series of recent Supreme Court
constitutional right to meaningfully cross-examine a live witness as long as the evidence is otherwise
deemed trustworthy); see also N.H. R. EVID. IIoI(d)(3) (precluding application of the rules of
evidence in transfer hearings).
93. See State ex rel B.T., 367 A.2d 887, 889-9o (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (holding that the
constitutional right to confrontation does not apply to preliminary proceedings, which only requires
that a defendant have representation and an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence).
94. See In re R.G.S., 575 S.W.2d 113, 117-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (finding that transfer
hearings, which do not determine guilt, do not require confrontation under the Sixth Amendment).
95. See In re Harbert, 538 P.2d 1212, 1216-17 (Wash. 1975) (en banc) (holding that because
juvenile transfer hearings do not result in confinement, they are not prosecutorial in nature and
therefore do not require Sixth Amendment guarantees of confrontation).
96. See Clemons v. State, 317 N.E.2d 859, 865-66 & n.12 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination does not apply to juvenile waiver hearings because
the offender's guilt is not at issue, but limiting the use of self-incriminating testimony to the issue of
"the child's welfare and the best interests of the state," and only where the waiver judge will not
subsequently be adjudicating guilt (quoting IND. CODE § 31-5-7-14 (1971))).
97. Hidalgo v. State, 983 S.W.2d 746, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (permitting admission of a
juvenile's confession to a doctor in transfer hearings despite Fifth and Sixth Amendment concerns).
98. J.G. v. State, 350 N.W.2d 668, 674 (Wis. 1984) (allowing admission of a reliable, though
facially involuntary, confession at a transfer hearing).
99. See William M. v. State, 196 P-3d 456, 457 (Nev. 2oo8). In William M., the Supreme Court of
Nevada held that Nevada's statute, which required a juvenile to rebut a presumption of transfer by
showing that his or her commission of the offense was "substantially influenced by substance abuse or
emotional or behavioral problems," required the juvenile to admit to the offense to avoid transfer in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 457. This decision overturned Nevada's more sweeping
opinion in Marvin v. State, 603 P-3d lo56 (Nev. 1979), which had generally allowed the admission of a
juvenile's inculpatory statements to determine if transfer was appropriate. See William M., 196 P.3d at
464. It remains to be seen whether Nevada will redraft its transfer statute to allow confessions
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment to be admitted during transfer hearings so long as
juveniles may rebut a presumption of transfer through other evidence.
ioo. See infra Part III.
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cases requires a reevaluation of this issue and, in fact, has sparked
renewed litigation over the level of procedural protections required in
transfer hearings. As will be discussed further in Part I, the Supreme
Court's

decisions in Apprendi,

'o'

Ring, 102 Blakely, ' Booker,

104

and

Cunninghamo' demand increased procedural protections where, as in
many states, the transfer decision exposes an offender to a sentence
higher than the statutory maximum that would apply in the juvenile
system. This Part summarizes Apprendi and its progeny.

A.

APPRENDI REDEFINES CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

In Apprendi, the Court considered a challenge to New Jersey's hatecrime sentencing enhancement.' Mr. Apprendi had entered a guilty plea
to two counts of "possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose" in the
second degree and one count of "unlawful possession of an antipersonnel
bomb" in the third degree." Under the relevant statute, Apprendi faced
a maximum sentence of ten years on the two greater counts.'" At
sentencing, however, the judge was allowed to consider the underlying
motive for Apprendi's actions.' The judge sentenced Apprendi to
twelve years in prison after finding, by only a preponderance of the
evidence and without submitting the issue to the jury, that Apprendi had
acted with the purpose to intimidate an individual based on race."o
Under New Jersey's statute, Apprendi had therefore committed a "hate
crime" and was subject to a sentencing enhancement."' Apprendi argued
that because the "hate crime" factor increased his possible punishment,
evidence of this factor should have gone to a jury for a determination of
his culpability beyond a reasonable doubt."' The Supreme Court agreed.
It began its analysis:
At stake in this case are constitutional protections of surpassing
importance: the proscription of any deprivation of liberty without "due
process of law," and the guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury." Taken together, these rights indisputably entitle a
criminal defendant to "a jury determination that [he] is guilty of every

101. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
102. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
103. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).

104. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
105. 549 U.S. 270 (2007).

io6. 530 U.S. at 468-69.
17. Id. at 469-70.
io8. Id. at 468,470 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 20:43-6(a)(2) (West 1995)).
1o9. Id. at 470-71.

i io. Id.
iii. Id.
112. Id. at 471.
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element of the crime with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable
doubt."" 3
The Court rejected New Jersey's argument that the factual decision
made by the judge was merely a "sentencing factor" and therefore not
subject to the same constitutional safeguards as an adjudication of
guilt."4 While acknowledging that "sentencing factors" and "elements"
are conceptually similar, the Court rejected the State's attempt to use the
labels interchangeably to shield certain factual determinations from
constitutional protection."' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority,
explained that "the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect."" 6
Where a factual determination has the effect of increasing the sentence
beyond the statutory maximum otherwise available, it "must be
submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""7 Justice
Stevens concluded: "Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable
doubt."" 8

B. EXTENDING APPRENDI
Two years later in Ring v. Arizona, the Court considered the extent
to which Apprendi applied to Arizona's death-penalty sentencing
scheme." 9 Timothy Ring was sentenced to death for his role in the
murder of an armored car driver in the course of a robbery allegedly
committed by Ring and two accomplices.1 20 At trial, the jury had
convicted Ring of first-degree murder, but did not convict him of
premeditated murder.' 2 ' Under Arizona's sentencing scheme, first-degree
murder was punishable by death or life imprisonment. 2 Once a jury
returned a verdict of guilt on first-degree murder, the trial judge was
required under the statute to consider the existence, or non-existence, of
certain enumerated aggravators in an effort to assess the appropriate
sentence.'12 The court had to find at least one aggravator, and no
mitigators sufficient to warrant leniency, before it could sentence a
113. Id. at 476-77 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting U.S.
CONsT. amends. VI, XIV; United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 5o6, 51 (1995)).
14. Id. at 491-97.
115. Id.

i16. Id. at 4o4.
117. Id. at 490. By creating an exception for cases where the sentence-enhancing fact is the mere
existence of a prior conviction, Apprendi avoided overruling Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224 (1998). See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487-90 & n.i4.
I18. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
19. 536 U.S. 584,588-89 (2002).
120. Id. at 591, 594-95.
121. Id. at 591.
122.

Id.

at 592 (citing ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.

§13-11o5(C)

123. Id. (citing ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C)).

(2001)).
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defendant to death.' 24 Ring challenged this scheme under Apprendi,
arguing that the factual finding of such circumstances increased his
potential sentence, and therefore should have been presented to a jury,
not a judge, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' The Court had
previously reviewed Arizona's statute in Walton v. Arizona, upholding
the statutory sentencing scheme."' In light of Apprendi, however, the

Court overturned Walton, reasoning that Arizona's statutory aggravators
operate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense"
by increasing the defendant's sentence from life imprisonment to death,
and therefore must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' The
Court explicitly rejected the State's argument that Ring was sentenced
within the range of punishment authorized by the jury verdict, reiterating
that Apprendi's procedural protections attached whenever some factor
exposed a defendant to a greater punishment than was otherwise
available-that the inquiry was "one not of form, but of effect."
Drawing a comparison to the two-year enhancement at issue in
Apprendi, the Court concluded in Ring that "[tlhe right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if
it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's
sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to
death.",2
In 2004, the Supreme Court again considered an Apprendi-based
challenge to a state sentencing scheme. Blakely v. Washington involved a
judge's imposition of a sentence in excess of the presumptive sentencing
range set forth in Washington State's sentencing guidelines. 30 In Blakely,
the defendant had pled guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving the
use of a firearm.'3 ' Under Washington State's Sentencing Reform Act
(SRA), Blakely's standard range for sentencing, based on the level of his
criminal offense and his prior criminal history, was forty-nine to fiftythree months.' The SRA, however, allowed a judge to exceed this
standard range and impose a higher or lower sentence if he or she found
"substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional
sentence."' While the SRA listed a series of "illustrative" aggravating
and mitigating factors, an exceptional sentence based on such factors
124. Id. at 592-93 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C)).

125. Id. at 595.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990).
Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S- 466, 494 n.19 (2000)).
Id. at 603-09 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
Id. at 6o9.

130. 542 U.S. 296, 298 (2oo4).
131. Id. at 298 9.
132. Id. at 299.
133. Id. (quoting WASH. REV.

COnE §9.94A.120(2)

ANN. §9.94A.535 (West 2oo3 & Supp. 2oo9))).

(2002) (current version at WASH. REV.

CODE
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could only be imposed if "it takes into account factors other than those
which are used in computing the standard range sentence for the

offense."' 34
Although the State in Blakely recommended a sentence within the
standard range, the court, after hearing testimony from the complaining
witness, imposed an exceptional sentence of ninety months.' Blakely
appealed, arguing that under the precedent established by Apprendi and
Ring he was entitled to a hearing before a jury in which the basis for the
exceptional sentence would have to be established beyond a reasonable
doubt.136 The United States Supreme Court agreed.' While Blakely's
sentence had not exceeded the ten-year statutory maximum for his
offense, the protections outlined in Apprendi nonetheless applied
because the sentence exceeded the presumptive range set forth in
Washington's sentencing guidelines. 3 The Court stated: "Our
precedents make clear ... that the 'statutory maximum' for Apprendi
purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the
defendant."'3 9The Court went on: "In other words, the relevant 'statutory
maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after
finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any
additional findings."' 40
The following term, in United States v. Booker, the Court considered
the impact of Apprendi on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.141The
lower court had increased Booker's sentence based on the court's finding
by a preponderance of the evidence that he had possessed a specified
quantity of cocaine and had committed additional, uncharged
misconduct.' 42 These facts were not considered by the jury and did not
134. Id. (quoting State v. Gore, 21 P.3d 262, 277 (Wash. 200) (en banc)).
135. Id. at 300.

136. See id.
at 301.
137.
138.
139.
14o.

Id. at 301-05.
Id. at 303-05.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 303-04 141. 543 U.S. 220, 226-27 (2oo5).

142. Id. at 227. The Booker case involved two different defendants, Booker and Fanfan, both of
whom had been convicted of possessing with the intent to distribute a given quantity of cocaine. Id. at
227-28. Both cases hinged on the fact that each defendant's jury had made a determination that he
possessed a specified quantity of cocaine, but at each man's sentencing hearing, the judge concluded
by a preponderance of the evidence that each had possessed additional quantities of drugs and had
committed additional, uncharged misconduct. Id. The jury in Booker's case found he possessed "92.5
grams of cocaine in his duffel bag." Id. at 227. The judge, at a sentencing hearing, however, found by a
preponderance of the evidence that he possessed an additional "566 grams of crack and that he was
guilty of obstructing justice." Id. The jury in Fanfan's case found that he possessed at least 500 grams
of cocaine, but his judge at a sentencing hearing found by a preponderance of the evidence that he
possessed 2.5 kilograms of cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack. Id. at 228. The judge also concluded, by a
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form the basis for the jury's verdict.' 43 Booker challenged his sentence,
arguing that Apprendi, as refined by Blakely, barred the judge from
imposing a sentence above that allowed by the jury's verdict based on the
judge's findings of additional facts by a preponderance of the evidence."
The Supreme Court concluded that the logic of Apprendi and
Blakely applies with equal force to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.'45
In doing so, the Court rejected the notion that the departures at issue in
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional just because,
historically, judges had been vested with the authority to increase a
defendant's sentence based on "any unusual blameworthiness in the
manner employed in committing a crime," and that guidelines set out
parameters for the exercise of this authority." 6 The Court emphasized
that, regardless of the label provided, any finding of fact that has the
effect of increasing the defendant's sentence must be proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt, or admitted by the defendant.'47 Booker's
sentence was constitutionally problematic because "the jury's verdict
alone does not authorize the sentence. The judge acquires that authority
only upon finding some additional fact." 48 The Court noted that
enhancing a defendant's sentencing range based on a judge's
determination of certain facts impermissibly increases the power of the
judge over the jury.'49 It allows judges, as opposed to juries, to determine
the upper limit of a sentence based on evidence that was never
contemplated by the jury or proven by more than a mere preponderance
of the evidence.'50
Two years later, in Cunningham v. California,' ' the Court found that
California's Determinate Sentencing Law (DSL) did not comport with

preponderance of the evidence, that Fanfan was an "organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the
criminal activity." Id. At this point, the two cases diverge. Based on his findings, the judge in Booker's
case imposed a sentence of thirty years, as opposed to the twenty-one-year and ten-month sentence
Booker had expected given his conviction and his criminal history. Id. at 227. In contrast, the judge in
Fanfan's case concluded that, in light of the Court's ruling in Blakely, he could only sentence the
defendant based on the jury's verdict. Id. at 229. Accordingly, Booker's sentence was enhanced under
the guidelines based on the judge's findings, while Fanfan's was not. See id. at 227-29. Booker
challenged his sentence and the Government appealed Fanfan's sentence. Id. at 229.
143. Id. at 227.
144. See id. at 226-29.

145. Id. at 226-27.
146. Id. at 235-36.
147. Id. at 230-37. In the portion of the opinion of the Court that he authored, Justice Breyer
attempted to bring the Sentencing Guidelines within the confines of the Apprendi case line by excising
the portions of the Guidelines which were mandatory. Id. at 244-72. The remaining "discretionary"
Sentencing Guidelines, according to Justice Breyer, met constitutional muster. See id.
148. Id. at 235 (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,305 (2004)).
149. Id. at 235-37.

i50. Id.
151. 549 U.S.

270 (2oo7).
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the holdings of the Apprendi case line because it "expose[d] a defendant
to an elevated 'upper term' sentence" based on factual findings made by
a judge, not a jury.' Cunningham was convicted of "continuous sexual
abuse of a child under the age of 14."1" Under the DSL he could be
sentenced to a low, middle, or upper term of sentence based on a judge's
findings.5 4 The judge was obligated under the DSL to impose the middle
term (here, twelve years) unless the judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence one or more additional circumstances in aggravation or
mitigation to justify imposition of either the upper or lower terms.' The
non-exhaustive list of aggravating circumstances included "[f]acts
relating to the crime, [f]acts relating to the defendant, [a)ny other facts
statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation."' 5 Beyond these
enumerated aggravators, the judge was "free to consider any 'additional
criteria reasonably related to the decision being made.""" The judge,
however, could not consider a "fact that [was] an element of the crime"
as a basis for imposing the upper term." t
The Supreme Court rejected the State's position that, in "operation
and effect," the DSL "simply authorize[d] a sentencing court to engage
in the type of factfinding that traditionally has been incident to the
judge's selection of an appropriate sentence within a statutorily
prescribed sentencing range" and therefore "the upper term is the
'statutory maximum"' and the guidelines scheme is permissible.'59 The
Court noted that it "has repeatedly held that, under the Sixth
Amendment, any fact that exposes a defendant to a greater potential
sentence must be found by a jury, not a judge, and established beyond a
reasonable doubt, not merely by a preponderance of the evidence."'6" In
the case of the DSL, because the judge could only impose the upper term
sentence upon a finding of aggravating circumstances and elements of
the offense did not qualify as such a circumstance, the middle term, not
the upper term, was the "relevant statutory maximum" for the purpose
of Apprendi and its progeny.16 Any system that exposed a defendant to a
potentially higher sentence based on findings made by a judge, not a jury,

152. Id. at 274.
153. Id. at 275.
154. Id. at 278 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.3(a)(2) (West 1999)).
155. Id. at 277 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a) (setting the lower-term sentence as six years, the
middle-term sentence as twelve years, and the upper-term sentence as sixteen years)).

156. Id. at 278 (alterations in original) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting
4.421(a)-(c)).
157. Id. at 278-79 (quoting People v. Black 113 P-3d 534,538 (Cal. 2oo5)).
158. Id. at 279 (quoting CAL. R. Cr. 4.4o8(a)).
159. Id. at 289 (quoting Black, 113 P-3d at 543).
60.i Id at281-82.
161. Id. at 288.

CAL.

R. Cr.
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"[could notl withstand measurement against our Sixth Amendment
precedent."'

2

In short:

[B]road discretion to decide what facts may support an enhanced
sentence, or to determine whether an enhanced sentence is warranted
in a particular case, does not shield a sentencing system from the force
of our decisions. If the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the
sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose
the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied."P'
In each of these holdings, even when faced with troubling fact
patterns that would seem to support an "exceptional" sentence, the
Supreme Court declined to limit the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment's
protections by altering the label, the nature, or the time frame in which
the sentencing court considered the relevant facts. Instead, the Supreme
Court returned to the most basic tenet of Apprendi time and time again.
Regardless of what the state called it, or how subjective the nature of it,
or when the judge considered it, any fact which exposed the defendant to
a higher sentence triggered Sixth Amendment and due process
protections and, therefore, must have been proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. The only exception the Court recognized was the fact
of prior convictions, which the Court reasoned had already satisfied due
process requirements.'6 4
C.

DOES ICE SIGNAL A CLOSING OF THE DOOR To APPRENDI-LAND?

In 2009, the Supreme Court seemed to take a step back from its
previous Apprendi case line in Oregon v. Ice.' 6' There the Court
considered the case of Thomas Ice, a man who had been convicted of
multple charges stemming from his sexual assault of an eleven-year-old
girl.' He was sentenced under a statute that provided for concurrent
sentences generally, but allowed a judge to imgose a consecutive
sentence upon finding "statutorily described facts."' Ice challenged the
trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence under Apprendi.'" He
argued that because Oregon's statute only permitted the judge to impose
a consecutive sentence if the judge found additional facts (beyond those
which formed the basis of the jury's verdict), under the Apprendi line,
such facts had to be proven to a jury using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard." The Court disagreed, holding that the threshold inquiry to
determine if Apprendi applies is whether the jury played a historical role
162. Id. at 293.
163. Id. at 290 (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,305 & n.8 (2004)).
164. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
165. 129 S. Ct. 711 (2009).

166. Id. at 715-16.
167. Id. at 715-17 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 137-123()

168. See id. at 716.
169. See id. at 715-16.

(2oo7)).
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in the issue to be decided.' In Ice's case, the Court concluded that "[t]he
historical record demonstrates that the jury played no role in the decision
to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently.""' Accordingly, the
judge's decision in Ice to impose a consecutive sentence premised on
additional factual findings did not implicate the concerns which had
prompted the Court's decisions in Apprendi and its progeny.7 2 This
decision did not represent an "encroachment" or "threat to the jury's
domain as a bulwark at trial between the State and the accused" but was
consistent with the historical practice to grant states authority over the
administration of their criminal justice systems.'" Ice did not overrule
Apprendi or any of the cases that followed. Instead, it attempted to
establish a baseline inquiry into the application of Apprendi's procedural
protections. The parameters of that baseline remain to be explored, but
the Court in Ice did not appear to abandon Apprendi's underlying
principle that the factual basis for culpability and sentencing must rest
with the jury and must be based on findings made using a beyond-areasonable-doubt standard.

III.

WHAT APPRENDI MEANS FOR JUVENILE TRANSFER PROCEEDINGS

The question thus becomes whether Apprendi and its progeny create
a constitutional guarantee to a jury trial with facts proven beyond a
reasonable doubt in juvenile transfer proceedings. While the purpose of
the hearing is not to impose a sentence, or even to assess culpability per
se, the potential outcome of the hearing, as the Kent Court observed, is
to greatly increase the offender's sentence from the juvenile limitusually confinement and/or probation to age twenty-one - to the adult
limit.174 Given that the majority of states' statutes governing transfer
address older minors (usually aged fifteen to eighteen) and the most
serious offenses (usually violent, serious violent, class A, or first-degree
felonies), it is likely that the adult standard range will be significantly
higher than any potential juvenile sentence.'
In determining the appropriateness of transfer, a court considers
specific factors to assess the appropriateness of continued juvenile
jurisdiction.1 6 In this sense, a transfer hearing fits the most basic criteria
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 716-19.
Id. at 717.

Id. at 718.
Id. at 717-19.

174. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554-57 (1966).
175. See generally HOWARD SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 1999
NATIONAL REPORT 102-08 (1999) (summarizing criteria for waiver legislation); Barry C. Feld, The
Juvenile Court Meets the Principleof the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 500-03 (1987); see also Feld, supra note 6, at 195-243 (discussing state
statutory schemes affecting transfer).

176. See Enrico Pagnanelli, Children as Adults: The Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Courts and the
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of Apprendi, Ring, Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham-a factfinder
engaging in a factual analysis that exposes a criminal offender to a higher
sentence than he or she would otherwise face. The rule set forth by the
Supreme Court in Apprendi, and reiterated in subsequent cases, is clear:
"Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.""' As
juvenile transfer decisions typically expose the offender to a sentence
well beyond that available in juvenile court, a plain reading of the
Apprendi case line requires this determination to be made by a jury
under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. A judge's finding of facts
to support transfer is distinguishable from the administrative
considerations contemplated in Ice." Findings to support transfer are not
a determination of how a sentence will be served, but rather a
determination of the type and length of sentence to be imposed.
Despite Apprendi's apparent applicability to juvenile transfer
hearings, courts have overwhelmingly declined to apply the Apprendi
case line to transfer decisions. "' Only the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court and the New Mexico Court of Appeals have read
Apprendi to require findings in juvenile transfer hearings to be made by
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'" The Massachusetts statute permits
juveniles to be transferred to the adult system upon finding certain
facts.

'"'

The court reasoned that these findings had the effect of

increasing the juveniles' sentences, if convicted, "beyond the statutory
maximum otherwise permitted for juveniles."' 82 The court concluded that
such determinations were covered by Apprendi.'t 3 Although a juvenile
court system is not constitutionally required, once a state creates such a

PotentialImpact of Roper v. Simmons, 44 AM. CRM. L. REV. 175, 181 (2007) (discussing judges' use of
factors to exercise review of transfer); see also Kent, 383 U.S. at 566-67 (providing a list of
determinative factors a judge should find prior to transfer).
177. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,490 (2ooo).
178. See 129 S. Ct. at 715-19.
179. See infra Part III.A-C.
'8o. See Commonwealth v. Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d 781, 789 (Mass. 2001), overruled on other
grounds by Commonwealth v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1201 n.28 (Mass. 2005); State v. Rudy B., 2009
NMCA 104, 216 P.3d 81o (N.M. Ct. App. 2009), cert. granted, No. 31,909 (N.M. Sept. 15, 2009),
availableat http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2oo9/o9ca-104.pdf.
181. See Quincy Q., 753 N.E.2d at 787. The required findings included: (i) "that the alleged
offense was committed when the juvenile was between" fourteen and seventeen years old; (2) that the
offense, in the adult system, was punishable by imprisonment; and (3) that the juvenile had previously
been "committed to the department of youth services, "or the alleged offense involved certain
enumerated firearms violations, or it involved 'the infliction or threat of serious bodily harm."' Id.
(quoting MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 119, § 54 (1996)).
182. Id. at 789.
183. See id.
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system, Apprendi's due process requirements govern decisions to remove
a child from the benefits of that system.'t
In State v. Rudy B., the New Mexico Court of Appeals revisited its
prior decision in State v. Gonzales'8 ' that Apprendi did not apply to an
amenability finding.'" Under New Mexico's system, when a juvenile is
convicted, the judge can sentence him or her as an adult following an
amenability hearing in which the judge considers factors eerily similar to
those laid out by the Court in Kent and Ring.'18 In Gonzales, the New
Mexico Court refused to apply Apprendi to amenability proceedings,
holding that a determination of amenability is distinct from a
determination of guilt.'" In Rudy B., the court reversed itself, concluding
that in light of the Supreme Court's rulings in Ring, Blakely, Booker, and
Cunningham, such a distinction was disingenuous.'" As New Mexico's
system requires additional findings of fact to justify an adult sentence, it
therefore falls squarely within the jurisprudential line of Apprendi.&
The majority of courts, however, have not followed Massachusetts's
and New Mexico's reasoning and have concluded instead that Apprendi
does not apply to juvenile transfer hearings. Courts have relied on three
primary lines of reasoning in refusing to apply Apprendi: (i) juvenile
transfer hearings merely determine the court's jurisdiction, (2) juvenile
transfer hearings do not adjudicate guilt or assess culpability, and (3)
fundamental differences between the juvenile and adult court system
mandate different constitutional requirements. 9 ' Under each of these
theories, the courts reason that if any of the due process or Sixth
Amendment concerns raised by the Apprendi case line do arise in the
context of transferring a juvenile to the adult court system, the concerns
184. See id.
185. 24 P.3d 776,783-84 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001).
186. State v. Rudy B., 2oo9 NMCA 104, 1 1,216 P.3d 81o (N.M. Ct. App. 2009), cert granted, No.
31,909 (N.M. Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.nmcompcomnm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2oo9/o9ca-o4.pdf.
187. See id. 1 19-33; see also N.M. STAT. §32A-2-20 (1993) (granting judges discretion to sentence
juvenile offenders as juveniles or adults based on findings of "[whether] the child is not amenable to
treatment or rehabilitation as a child in available facilities;" "[whether] the child is not eligible for
commitment to an institution for children with developmental disabilities or mental disorders," "the
seriousness of the alleged offense;" "whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive,
violent, premeditated or willful manner;" "whether a firearm was used to commit the alleged offense;"
"whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to
offenses against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;" "the sophistication and maturity of the
child as determined by consideration of the child's home, environmental situation, social and
emotional attitude and pattern of living;" "the record and previous history of the child;" "the
prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the
child by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available;" "and any other relevant
factor, provided that factor is stated on the record").
188. Gonzales, 24 P.3d at 78344.
189. See Rudy B., 2009 NMCA 104,
190. Id.
23-34.
191. See infra Part Ill.A-C.

1

23-31,36-44,49-51.
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are satisfied in two places: first, in juvenile court when the judge
determines the appropriateness of the transfer, and later, in adult court
when the juvenile is convicted by a jury of the offense that justified
transferring the child to, and sentencing him or her in, adult court.

A.

IT'S ONLY JURISDICnON (AND ALL THE COURTS ARE DOING IT)

The vast majority of courts have held that a judge's decision whether
a juvenile should be prosecuted as an adult is a pre-adjudicatory question
of jurisdiction and therefore does not implicate the Apprendi case line.' 9 2
In their rulings, these courts have reasoned that it is only after the
transfer to the adult court system that a juvenile is subject to the higher
sentence. In the adult court system, the juvenile already enjoys all of the
protections of Apprendi-trial by jury using a proof beyond-areasonable-doubt standard-when he or she stands trial for the offense
and before any sentence can be imposed. Therefore, no additional rights
or procedural protections are necessary. This argument is essentially the
same as is used to justify suspension of other constitutional rights and
due

process

protections

in transfer

hearings,

such as the

Fifth

Amendment right against self-incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right
to confrontation, and evidentiary
Apprendi is flawed on several levels.

rules.

'"

This attempt to evade

0oo4(9th Cir. 2003) ("Apprendi does not
192. See, e.g., United States v. Miguel, 338 F-3d 995,
require that a jury find the facts that allow the transfer to district court. The transfer proceeding
establishes the district court's jurisdiction over a defendant."); United States v. Juvenile, 228 F-3d 987,
990 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that the transfer of a juvenile to an adult court "merely establishes 'a
basis for district court jurisdiction' (quoting United States v. David H., 29 F.3d 489, 491 (9th Cir.
1994))); State v. Kalmakoff, 122 P-3d 224, 227 & n.29 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005) (reasoning that the
weight of authority indicates that transfer proceedings are mere determinations of the court's
jurisdiction and therefore not governed by Apprendi); State v. Rodriguez, 71 P.3d 919, 928 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that the state juvenile transfer statute in question "is not a sentence enhancement
scheme and, therefore, does not implicate Apprendi ... [because it] does not subject [a] juvenile to
enhanced punishment; it subjects [a] juvenile to the adult criminal justice system" (citation omitted));
People v. Beltran, 765 N.E.2d so7', so76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that transfer merely establishes
jurisdiction and therefore is "dispositional, not adjudicatory"); State v. Jones, 47 P.3d 783, 793-98
(Kan. 2002); Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 445, 452-53 (Ky. 2004) (adopting the argument
that the decision to transfer a juvenile is merely jurisdictional); In re Welfare of J.C.P., 716 N.W.2d
664, 667-7o (Minn. Ct. App. 2oo6) (holding that as the adult certification procedure "is not in itself a
criminal prosecution," Apprendi does not bear on such a proceeding); State v. Lopez, 196 S.W.3d 872,
875-76 (Tex. App. 2oo6) (holding that a decision authorizing "prosecution of a juvenile as an adult"
merely "involves the determination of which system will be appropriate for a juvenile offender,"
thereby not implicating Apprendi); In re Hegney, 158 P-3d 1193, 1200-o (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)
(echoing the holdings of Kalmakoff, 122 P-3d 224, and State v. HO., 81 P.3 d 883 (Wash. Ct. App.
2003), in declining to apply Apprendi to state juvenile declination proceedings); HO., 81 P-3d at 886
(declining to apply Apprendi to the state's decline statute because such a determination is a mere
"jurisdictional determination"). Scholars have taken this position as well. See, e.g., Feld, supra note II,
at 1221 (arguing that because transfer decisions are jurisdictional and do not carry a punishment,
Apprendi is inapplicable).
193. See supra Part I.
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Turning first to the question of timing, the fact that transfer hearings
occur prior to the adjudication of guilt does not insulate them from the
protections of Apprendi. Apprendi and its progeny focus on the effect of
a finding on a defendant's sentence, not on the procedural sequence of
the finding.'" To accept the logic that the protections of Apprendi are
contingent on the timing of the hearing would mean that New Jersey's
sentencing scheme would have withstood constitutional muster had New
Jersey allowed the court to consider prior to Apprendi's adjudication of
guilt whether or not he had acted with racial animus and then used that
finding to increase his sentence after the jury found him guilty of the
underlying offense. Similarly, so long as Arizona's court determined that
Ring was eligible for death prior to his trial, or Washington's court had
determined that Blakely deserved an "exceptional sentence" prior to his
entry of his plea, it would not have mattered that the factors were neither
submitted to a jury nor judged using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard. These findings are contrary to the Court's holding that it is the
effect, not the form of the factors that trigger Sixth Amendment and due
process protections.'" Considered from another angle, if the juvenile
court determined that transfer (and hence a higher adult sentence) was
appropriate after an adjudication of guilt had occurred within the
juvenile system, there is little doubt that Apprendi would apply.' 0
In Cunningham, the Court spoke in terms of a defendant's exposure
to the higher sentence based on the judge's determination of facts by a
preponderance of the evidence as the trigger for Apprendi's protections,
not of the actual finding of guilt or the subsequent imposition of the
sentence."'7 This would seem to suggest that the Court would be
unbothered by whether or not the juvenile was ultimately transferred,
convicted, or sentenced as an adult, just that he or she was exposed to the
risk of an adult sentence and conviction based on the judge's assessment
of amenability to remain in the juvenile system. Just as Cunningham
afforded Apprendi's procedural protections when the sentencing scheme
allowed a )udge to weigh facts prior to the imposition of the higher
sentence, 19 a juvenile should receive the procedural protection of
Apprendi prior to a judge weighing facts that allow imposition of
transfer, and thus potentially conviction and sentencing as an adult. As
will be discussed below, such a triggering of procedural protections prior
194. See supra Part II.
195. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (20oo) ("'[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect. . . .").
196. In fact, this was exactly the conclusion the New Mexico Court of Appeals reached in State v.
Rudy B. See 2oo9 NMCA 104, 1 53, 216 P-3d 81o (N.M. Ct. App. 2009), cert. granted, No. 31,909 (N.M.
Sept. 15, 2009), availableat http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2oo9/o9ca-Io4.pdf.
197. See 549 U.S. 270, 279-81 (2007).
198. See id. at 290.
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to the imposition of the "harm" is consistent with other, analogous trial
procedural protections.
The next argument, that the transfer hearing avoids Apprendi
because it is merely jurisdictional, is also problematic. First, this
argument ignores the critical consequence of the jurisdictional question
in the context of transfer hearings, namely that the determination of the
appropriate jurisdiction has a direct impact on the juvenile's sentence.'"
If the juvenile court retains jurisdiction over the offender, the offender
will be subjected only to the juvenile sentencing scheme, which in most
states terminates at the age of majority." If the juvenile court declines to
retain jurisdiction and transfers the juvenile to the adult court system, the
offender will be subject to the higher adult sentencing range. In the
context of the Apprendi case line, this would be analogous to a state
having a separate "death penalty" court in which, once it was determined
that a defendant should be tried there, he or she would automatically
receive the death penalty upon conviction. If the defendant were not sent
to the death penalty court, he or she could only receive a maximum
sentence of life-imprisonment upon conviction. It is implausible that
couching this determination as "jurisdictional" would somehow avoid the
Apprendi due process considerations. As the Court recognized in Ring,
Apprendi would require that any facts used to justify sending a defendant
to this hypothetical, standalone death penalty court would have to be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, because those facts expose
the defendant to a higher sentence than he or she would otherwise face.
In its recent decision, the New Mexico Court of Appeals recognized
that allowing the judge to essentially postpone determination of transfer
until after conviction does not allow evasion of Apprendi.o' The New
Mexico Court concluded that despite its prior decision, because
determinations of amenability can serve to increase a juvenile's sentence
beyond that authorized by the jury's verdict or a plea agreement alone,
Apprendi must apply regardless of the timing of the determination.2 2
More fundamentally, to exempt juvenile transfer hearings from
Apprendi's purview by labeling them "jurisdictional" is to ignore the
elemental nature of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is an element of all offenses
and must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or stipulated to
199. See Vannella, supra note 19, at 758 (noting that the key issue in determining if Apprendi
should apply is the effect of the finding on the defendant's sentence).
Zoo. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Estelle, 5og F.2d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1975) (discussing the limited
jurisdiction of juvenile courts); State v. Setala, 536 P.2d 176, 178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975) (same); State
v. Dellinger, 468 S.E.2d 218, 220 (N.C. 1996) (same); Feld, supra note ii, at 1219 (discussing limitation
on juvenile court jurisdiction which includes limitations on sentencing until the state-designated age of
majority).
201. See Rudy B., 2oo9 NMCA 104,
202. Id.

1
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by a defendant before any determination of guilt can be made.2 Without
a finding of jurisdiction, the prosecutor lacks the authority to charge a
defendant, a jury lacks the authority to consider his or her guilt, and the
court lacks the authority to hold or impose sentence upon him or her. A
determination of jurisdiction cannot be divorced from any other factual
finding a jury must make in order to convict a defendant. The Model
Penal Code notes that while there is a distinction between facts which
establish criminality and facts which satisfy procedural requirements,
both must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury as both are
elements of the offense.2 4 There is nothing in the Apprendi case line that
exempts this particular element. If anything, Apprendi would seem to
embrace this most fundamental element, as without establishment of
jurisdiction no adjudication of guilt, much less sentence, can be imposed.
B.

THE COURT

Is NOT WEIGHING

CRIMINAL CULPABILITY

Similar in nature and only slightly less popular with the courts is the
reasoning that the decision to transfer a juvenile to the adult court is
immune from Apprendi analysis because it does not culminate in a
finding of guilt. 05 In defending this position, courts are quick to note that
some of the factors considered in deciding whether to transfer a juvenile
are different from those traditionally weighed by juries in assessing
culpability, or by the adult court system as a whole, and may require a
level of expertise that juries would lack.' The court's consideration of
such factors or the fact that the transfer decision does not, by itself,
adjudicate the offender's guilt, however, cannot exempt it from the
203. See, e.g., Liggins v. Burger, 422 F-3d 642, 649 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting that because jurisdiction
is an essential element of the crime, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
204. The drafters of the Model Penal Code spelled out the reasoning adopted by state and federal
courts with regard to the requirement of proving jurisdiction. Without an establishment of jurisdiction,
the court cannot exercise sovereignty over the defendant and so cannot seek to hold a defendant
criminally accountable for his or her actions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(9)(e) (1985) (establishing
jurisdiction as "an element of an offense"); MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13 cmt. i,at 1o9 (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 1955).
205. See, e.g., Alaska v. Kalmakoff, 122 P-3d 224, 227-28 (Alaska Ct. App. 2oo5) (concluding that
juvenile transfer proceedings were distinct from findings of guilt or sentencing and therefore were not
addressed by Apprendi or its progeny); State v. Jones, 47 P-3d 783, 797-98 (Kan. 2002) (concluding
that Apprendi did not apply to transfer hearings because they did not strictly decide guilt or
innocence); State v. H.O., 81 P.3d 883, 885 (Wash Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a decline hearing
"determined not ultimate guilt or innocence, but the forum in which guilt or innocence was to be
found").
2o6. See, e.g., State v. Read, 938 A.2d 953, 960 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2008) (analogizing a
decision to transfer to a charging decision with the consideration of additional factors to determine
both the proper charge and forum for the juvenile offender). This reasoning was rejected in Rudy B.
See 2oo9 NMCA 104, IT 47-50 ("The fact that an amenability determination is apart from the
elements of the charged crime has no bearing on whether Apprendi applies because the additional
facts necessary to determine whether a youthful offender is amenable to treatment have the potential
to increase the offender's sentence.").
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protections afforded by Apprendi. Consider Ring, Blakely, and
Cunningham. Under Arizona's sentencing scheme the absence or
presence of an aggravator or mitigator did not make Ring, or any other
Arizona defendant, more or less guilty of first-degree murder. In fact, in
order to reach the question of the existence of such factors, a
determination of guilt must already have been reached. The only effect
of such findings is to increase the defendant's sentence from life in prison
to death, and that is precisely what triggered Apprendi." Similarly, in
Blakely and Cunningham, the judges' finding of factors to justify a higher
sentence were made after a finding of guilt had been determined.""In
addition, both Washington's and California's sentencing schemes
explicitly required the court to consider factors other than those required
for a finding of guilt in order to justify a higher sentence." Finally, the
Court addressed this argument in another context in both the Booker
and Cunningham cases. In both cases the Court noted that sentencing
schemes were not immune from the analysis of Apprendi because the
judge had based the defendant's higher sentence on facts which were
"ordinarily" not considered in the jury's assessment of culpability.2 0
Returning to the tenet of Blakely, both cases reiterated that sentences
based on a finding of fact beyond those upon which the jury's verdict was
based were constitutionally impermissible."'
The Court's decision in Ice raises an additional, threshold question
of whether the decision to transfer a child to the adult court system falls
outside the realm of facts that juries have historically considered."' One
possible reading of Ice is that Apprendi need not apply to transfer
decisions because, historically, the jury has never been asked to make
such a decision.213 The fact that judges have traditionally made the
findings that support transfer, however, does not answer the underlying
question posed by the Court in Ice or, for that matter, Apprendi. The
Apprendi line seeks to reclaim the jury's role as sole arbiter of culpability
upon which any criminal sentence can be based." Apprendi and its
207. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592 (2002) (citing ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(c)
(West 2001)).
2o8. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 277 (2007); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,
298-99 (2oo4).

209. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 270 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.5(a) (West 1999)); Blakely,
542 U.S. at 299 (citing WASH. REV. CODE. § 9 .9 4 A.120(2) (2oo2) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 9.94A.535 (West 2003 &sUpp. 2009))).
210. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 234-36 (2005); Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 279-81.
211. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234-36; Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 279-81, 2904.
212. See 129 S. Ct. 711, 718-19(2009).
213. This is in fact the argument the State made unsuccessfully in State v. Rudy B. See 2009 NMCA
104, 11 23-34, 216 P-3d 8io (N.M. Ct. App. 2009), cert. granted, No. 31,909 (N.M. Sept. 15, 2009),
availableat http://www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2009/o9ca-Io4.pdf.

214. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 236-37.
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progeny, including Ice, admonish courts to look beyond the State's selfserving classifications of findings to the effect of such findings on the
defendant's sentence."' If the finding increases the defendant's sentence,
it is an element of the offense and it must be made by the jury.216 While
the fact in question may bear some label besides "element," if it is to
serve as a basis for the defendant's sentence it must be rooted in an
assessment of culpability and its pronouncement must emanate from the
jury (or, in the case of a plea from the defendant, him- or herself).' Such
an understanding of Apprendi's underlying principle produces a reading
of the holding in Ice consistent with the Court's prior Apprendi holdings:
that Ice's jury had found the facts upon which his sentence was based.
The sentencing court's later decision to run such sentences consecutively,
as opposed to the time-saving, statutorily presumed method of imposing
sentences concurrently, did not increase Ice's total sentence, it merely
altered its administration.' This finding by Ice's judge did not implicate
additional culpability, nor did it increase the length of Ice's sentence. It
only altered the way he served the sentence (one after another as
opposed to simultaneously under the temporal legal fiction of concurrent
time).219
In contrast, the facts which would support a decision to transfer a
juvenile to the adult court system do more than determine the manner in
which the juvenile will serve his or her sentence upon conviction. The
determination of these facts alters the sentence itself, increasing its
nature, length, and collateral consequences.
The conclusion that Ice does not preclude application of Apprendi to
juvenile transfer decisions is consistent with the Court's holding in other
cases. In fact, the factors considered by the Court in Ring, Blakely,
Booker, and Cunningham mirror some of the Kent factors that often
govern juvenile transfer decisions.220 Under the scheme at issue in Ring,
the Court considered the following statutory aggravators in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty: whether the defendant had been
convicted of another offense for which he or she could be sentenced to
either life imprisonment or death; whether the defendant had been
"previously convicted of a serious offense";' whether, in the commission

215. See Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 718-19; Booker, 543 U.S. at 230-32; Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 290-94;
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2oo2); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2ooo).
216. See, e.g., Apprendi, 542 U.S. at 303.
217. See, e.g., Ice, 129 S. Ct. at 716-17.
218. See id. at 716-20.
at 715-16.
219. See id.
220. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
221. ARmz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-6o4(w)(4) (West 2oo) (repealed 2007). This statute defines a
"serious offense" as
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of the offense, the defendant "knowingly created a grave risk of death to
another person or persons in addition to the person murdered"; whether
the defendant committed the murder for remuneration; whether the
murder was especially "heinous, cruel or depraved"; whether "[t]he
defendant committed the offense while in custody" or on unauthorized
release; whether the defendant was convicted of multiple homicides in
the commission of the offense; whether "[t]he defendant was an adult"
when he or she committed the offense "or was tried as an adult" and the
victim was either under fifteen or over seventy years of age; and whether
the victim "was an on duty peace officer" killed in the course of his or
her official duties."' Under the scheme at issue in Blakely, the sentencing
court was allowed to consider factors such as the defendant's deliberate
cruelty to the victim, the vulnerability of the victim, and the history of
domestic violence (whether adjudicated or not) between the defendant
and the victim.22 3 In Booker, the court assessed the defendant's degree of
culpability, and so his appropriate sentence, based on his apparent
involvement in a drug trafficking scheme which extended beyond his
mere possession of the drugs, the crime for which he was convicted.224
Under the scheme at issue in Cunningham, the court considered similar
factors, including the vulnerability of the victim, the effect of the crime
on the victim's family, and the defendant's relationship to the victim.22' In
all of these cases, the Supreme Court applied Apprendi to require that
such findings be made by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.226

any of the following offenses if committed in this state or any offense committed outside
this state which if committed in this state would constitute one of the following offenses:
(a) First degree murder.
(b) Second degree murder.
(c) Manslaughter;
(d) Aggravated assault resulting in serious physical injury or involving the discharge, use
or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.
(e) Sexual assault.
(f) Any dangerous crime against children.
(g) Arson of an occupied structure.
(h) Armed robbery.
(i) Burglary in the first degree.
(j) Kidnapping
(k) Sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age.

Id.
222. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 592 & n.i (2oo2) (citing Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(G)
(West Supp. 2001)).
223. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 29G, 299-300 (2004) (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.390(2)
(2003)).

224. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 227-29 (2005).
225. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 277 (2007) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE §I170(b) (West
1999).S

226.

See supra Part 11.
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The factors governing juvenile transfer decisions are remarkably
similar. Using the Kent factors, a juvenile court considers the following in
deciding whether to waive juvenile jurisdiction: the seriousness of the
offense and "whether protection of the community requires waiver";
whether the offense was "committed in an aggressive, violent,
premeditated or willful manner"; whether the alleged offense was
committed against a person with injury resulting; "the prosecutive merit
of the case"; judicial efficiency if there were adult codefendants; the
sophistication of the offender; whether he or she had prior adjudications
and/or commitments to juvenile facilities; and "the likelihood of
reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile."' Just like the schemes at issue
in Ring, Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham, juvenile transfer decisions
examine not only the crime committed, with an eye toward future
community safety, but also the offender him- or herself. In short, each of
these schemes considers factors which are subjective, divorced from the
offense itself, and may be difficult for jurors to weigh both intellectually
and morally. These similarities suggest that the protections and rights
afforded by Apprendi are no less applicable. As the Court noted in
Booker, it is irrelevant whether the findings reflect a heightened level of
guilt on the part of the defendant or are facts traditionally beyond the
consideration of the jury.""In all of these examples, the findings increase

the defendant's sentence, and it is this effect on the ultimate sentence
that triggers the protections of Apprendi."' In this sense, the protections
of Apprendi do not hinge on whether the hearing involves a
determination of guilt, but on what effect the determination of the
factors would have on the defendant's sentence.
As will be discussed further in Part IV, the holdings in the Apprendi
case line suggest something else as well-that the lines between notions
of "guilt" and "punishment" are blurring. Factors that allow courts or
juries to mete out appropriate punishment cannot be divorced from the
factual findings necessary to establish the basis for that punishment-a
defendant's guilt. The Apprendi line would define this concept of the
defendant's guilt as encompassing more than the acts he or she
committed, but also "facts" about the defendant him- or herself.
C. JUVENILE COURT Is DIFFERENT
The final argument that most courts, and indeed scholars, invoke
when refusing to apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings is that
there is a fundamental difference between the juvenile and the adult

Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966).
See Booker, 543 U.S. at 230-37.
229. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2ooo) ("[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of
form, but of effect. . . ."),
227.
228.
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criminal justice systems. 30 These courts reason that the Due Process
Clause requires "fundamental fairness" in juvenile proceedings; but this
concept of "fundamental fairness" is not the same as that guaranteed in
the adult court system, and may not even derive from the same
constitutional basis.' Therefore, even though the transfer hearing may
expose the juvenile to a greater sentence, Kent's requirement of
"fundamental fairness" in juvenile court is satisfied when a judge makes
a transfer decision using a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.232
This line of reasoning is problematic for several reasons. First, it
begs the question of precisely how different is the juvenile system?
Certainly the juvenile justice system encompasses goals of rehabilitation
and redemption not normally found in the adult system. In addition, the
origins of the juvenile justice system as discussed in Part I draw from a
tradition which is distinct from that of the adult court system. But in
reality, is there something inherent in a state's adjudication of juvenile
offenders that reduces, alters, or abrogates due process protections? This
is the question the courts have struggled with in attempting to define the
precise protections necessary to avoid arbitrary application of the law
while still achieving the lofty, and well-placed, policy goals that prompted
the states to create juvenile justice systems in the first place.
At its most fundamental level, a juvenile justice system is a statesanctioned recognition that there is and ought to be a difference between
the criminal adjudication of adults and children. This is evident in the
differences between the factors considered in Kent and those considered
in Ring, Blakely, and Cunningham. The biggest difference is Kent's
consideration of the juvenile's ability to be rehabilitated.233 But such
differences do not exempt juvenile systems from constitutional
obligations. In Gault, the Court recognized that the good intentions of
the juvenile court system had, in practice, paved the road to hell for
many juveniles who suffered under arbitrary enforcement and sentences,
meted out in a system void of procedural safeguards.234 And while the
230. See, e.g., Feld, supra note ii, at 1221-22 (concluding that Apprendi should not be applied to
juvenile transfer because to do so would radically and irredeemably alter the nature of the juvenile
court system).
231. See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.C.P., Jr., 716 N.W.2d 664, 668 (Minn. Ct. App. 2oo6)
("[F]undamental fairness under the Due Process Clause does not guarantee juveniles every right
criminal defendants enjoy, such as the right to a jury trial.").
232. People v. Beltran, 765 N.E.2d 1o71, 1o76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) ("It is well established that, in a
juvenile proceeding, due process does not require a jury.. . . [A]lthough the juvenile court made
findings that exposed [the offender] to a greater sanction, [the] defendant had no due process right to
have a jury make those findings beyond a reasonable doubt." (citations omitted)).

233. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 552-55 (1966).
234. In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 24, 27-28 (1967) (noting that the concept of the kindly juvenile court

judge and the system that operates in the best interest of the child was more "rhetoric than reality"
and "the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court" with no procedural protections).
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Court's decision in McKeiver backed off the procedural reform that had
begun in Gault,235 the Court continued to recognize that while an
independent juvenile justice system is not constitutionally mandated,
once statutorily created, the state cannot deny a juvenile constitutionally
sanctioned due process protections in that system. 236 It is illogical,
therefore, to claim that because a transfer analysis occurs while an
offender is still within the context of the juvenile court system, that
somehow the transfer decision is exempt from Apprendi's protections.
To do so overlooks the recognized need for due process within the
context of juvenile proceedings and, more fundamentally, ignores that
the proceeding in question occurs when the state wishes to remove the
juvenile from the benefits or protections of the juvenile court system and
place him or her in the adult system."
Kent makes clear that once juvenile jurisdiction is created, not only
must transfer of a juvenile out of that system to the adult system comport
with basic principles of due process, but these protections must trigger
prior to the transfer." Because a juvenile court's jurisdiction is limited by
the offender's age, its statutory sentencing range is likewise restricted in
most jurisdictions to either the legal age of majority or twenty-one.23 9 In
this sense, a transfer hearing conducted in the juvenile court system is
not dissimilar to the sentencing schemes addressed in Apprendi, Ring,
Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham. Just as a minor is not entitled to trial
or sentencing in a juvenile court, neither Apprendi, Ring, Blakely,
Booker, nor Cunningham were entitled to a specific sentence for the
crimes they allegedly committed, outside of the general protection
against cruel and unusual punishment. The holdings in Apprendi, Ring,
Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham establish that once there is a
statutorily-defined sentencing range, however, a defendant is entitled to
be sentenced within that range. Blakely and Cunningham go even one
step further, holding that a defendant is entitled to whatever sentence the

235. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,545-51(1971) (plurality opinion).

236. The exception, of course, is the right to a jury, which scholars have argued must now be
provided to juveniles under Apprendi. See, e.g., Feld, supra note II, at 1223-24 (arguing that Apprendi
requires the overturn of McKeiver, allowing juveniles to enjoy the right to a jury trial even in juvenile
court).
237. The Court of Appeals for the State of New Mexico noted this irony in Rudy B., indicating it
seems illogical to say that a juvenile should be denied a jury to assess amenability because juvenile
court has no place for such procedure. See 2oo9 NMCA 104, 11 23-24, 216 P-3d 81o (N.M. Ct. App.
2009), cert. granted, No. 31,909 (N.M. Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://www.nmcompcomm.us/
nmcases/NMCA/2oo9/o9ca-1o4.pdf. This is because the point of such a finding is to remove the
juvenile to the adult system where he or she would be "afforded the constitutional rights of an adult,
presumably including the jury trial right, and . . . the attendant Apprendi protections" upon sentencing.
Id. 24.
238. Kent, 383 U.S. at 552-53239. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 64-89.
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state has defined as applicable to him or her under the presumptive
sentencing guidelines. Efforts to exceed this range, whether for two
additional years (as in Apprendi) or for a death sentence (as in Ring),
trigger the same constitutional protection as an effort to implement any
other sentence-proof of a factual basis for that sentence to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. In the same sense, once the state has created
a juvenile court system with lower sentencing ranges, efforts to remove a
juvenile from that system and subject him or her to the adult court
system and its higher maximum sentencing ranges must trigger equally
stringent protections. Essentially, such a system creates two crimes-a
standard juvenile crime, punishable only by incarceration within the
juvenile system, and an "aggravated" juvenile crime, punishable by a
much larger adult sentence. As in Apprendi, Ring, Blakely" Booker, and
Cunningham, the facts that justify the longer sentence must be proven to
a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. To evade such protections by labeling
a juvenile system fundamentally different would violate Apprendi's most
basic admonition that a sentencing court must consider what effect its
finding would have on an offender's potential sentence. If that effect is to
increase his or her sentence beyond what would otherwise be
permissible, the fact must go to a jury to be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt -regardless of how the state chooses to label that finding or
whether the state would prefer a different process for making that
finding.
A subtext present in many court opinions rejecting the application of
Apprendi to transfer proceedings is the normative premise that there is
some inherent benefit to a juvenile-court judge reviewing the factors
relevant for transfer that cannot be duplicated with presentation to the
jury." This argument assumes that juvenile court judges are uniquely
attuned both to the abilities of the juvenile court system, and to the
circumstances and lives that bring juvenile offenders before them. Such
acumen is acquired only by practice and knowledge of the juvenile
system and cannot be readily demonstrated by the average citizen that
populates a jury. This position, however, seems to give too much credit
to juvenile court judges, while belittling jurors. Juvenile court judges are
no more or less immune to the politics and cynicism that often affect
their adult court comrades. As the Supreme Court noted in McKeiver,
240. Feld, supra note II, at 1221-22 (referencing People v. Beltran, 765 N.E.2d 1o71 (Ill. App. Ct.
2oo2), State v. Jones, 47 P-3d 783 (Kan. 2002), and State v. Gonzales, 24 P-3d 776 (N.M. Ct. App. 2001),

and arguing that the juvenile's best interests are served by allowing judges, not juries, to make transfer
decisions given the complexity of the decision and the factors that affect it). Despite repeated claims
that the juvenile court tradition offers benefits beyond those of the adult court system, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly imposed constitutional protections on the system. See Vannella, supra note 19, at
754 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26, 33-34 (967); Kent, 383
U.S. at 562).
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"too often the juvenile court judge falls far short of that stalwart,
protective, and communicating figure the system envisaged." 24 '
As for the jury, the Court's ruling in Ring entrusts the jury with the
most important decision a person can make-whether to allow the State
to deliberately kill another as a punishment for a crime.242 Juries are
frequently asked to review and weigh complex matters. The whole
notion of admitting the testimony of expert witnesses and allowing jurors
to consider their testimony in adjudicating guilt is a testament to the
system's reliance on jurors' ability to sort through complex matters to
reach a just conclusion. Apprendi seizes on this notion, exalting juries as
not only reliable fact finders, but constitutionally-mandated ones.2 43 The
Apprendi case line has been read as a move to temper the relatively
novel sentencing procedures with the due process protections of the
common law-i.e., a right to have one's peers ascertain the extent of
one's guilt. 2" Even if one agrees that a juvenile-court judge is somehow
better equipped to examine the factors pertinent to a transfer
consideration, there is nothing inherent about that sensitivity that would
justify suspension of the Fourteenth Amendment's standard-of-proof
protection in transfer hearings.
A final possibility, as noted by the Kansas court in Jones, may be a
hesitance to attach new federal constitutional rights and protections to
the state-created juvenile court systems without a clear ruling by the
Supreme Court requiring such an attachment.245 This reluctance, while
understandable, is indefensible in the face of what is at stake-the
removal of a child from the juvenile system into an adult court system
that, if the child is found guilty, will impose an adult sentence on the
child that will punish but will not seek to rehabilitate.

IV.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE: EXPLAINING COURTS'
RELUCTANCE To APPLY APPRENDI

For the reasons described above, the principle of Apprendi and its
progeny boils down to effect over form-if the defendant could not
receive a particular sentence without the finding of an additional fact,
then that additional fact must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt.2 46 This principle applies to findings that justify a juvenile transfer
decision, which are necessary prerequisites to subjecting a juvenile to
241. 4u3 U.S. 528, 544 (97) (plurality opinion).
242. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S 584, 603-09 (2002); Vannella, supra note 19, at 76o (arguing that
if juries can decide death, they can decide juvenile transfer).
243. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000).

244. See Vannella, supra note 19, at 759 (arguing that requiring juries to consider factors under the
sentencing guidelines "temper[s]" the novelty of the sentencing procedures).
245. State v. Jones, 47 P-3d 783, 795 (Kan. 2002).
246. See supra Part II.
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higher adult sentences, and the justifications courts have offered for
avoiding Apprendi in this context fail to withstand scrutiny.247 Why, then,
do so many courts decline to follow the Apprendi case line when
confronted with the prospect of transferring a juvenile to the adult court
system where he or she will face greater deprivations of liberty?
There are several possibilities. The most obvious is that for the vast
majority of systems, requiring jury findings under a beyond-areasonable-doubt standard would so radically alter the process that the
court has known that it is simply too much for courts to contemplate."
Having said this, juries are not unheard of in juvenile court. Ten
jurisdictions allow juries to adjudicate guilt in juvenile court in some
form or under certain circumstances.249 These jurisdictions, however, are
the exception, not the rule. Even within these jurisdictions, juries seem
underutilized compared to their use in the adult court system.2 o But
there are other possibilities as well. First, the Apprendi case line
challenges the segregation between elements that support a finding of
guilt and other facts or findings that justify a particular sentence."' This is
a hard concept to embrace in a system that has striven to separate the
two. One goal of the American criminal justice system is to convict only
for the crime charged, and to punish based solely on one's culpability for
that crime. It is well established, for example, that evidence regarding
prior misconduct, even that for which a defendant has been convicted, or
uncharged misconduct, can only be admitted in the guilt phase of a
proceeding under limited circumstances."' This is not a bad thing. It is
not only a commentary on the questionable quality of this evidence, but
247. See supra Part III.
248. See Feld,supra note ii, at 1211.

249. See ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.110 (2008) (allowing juries in juvenile court if the juvenile is charged
with a crime that if committed by an adult could result in incarceration); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-505
(2oo8) (allowing juries in juvenile court if the juvenile is charged as an "extended juvenile jurisdiction
offender"); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 19-2-107 (West 2005) (allowing juries in juvenile court if the
juvenile is charged with a crime that would make him or her an "aggravated juvenile offender" or
charged with what would be classified as a "crime of violence" if committed by an adult); MAsS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. Ix9, § 56 (West 2oo8); N.M. STAT. § 32A-2-16 (2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1o, § 73034.1 (West 2007): TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.03 (Vernon 2oo8); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-5-6 (LexisNexis
2004 & Supp. 2oo8); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-223 (2009); In re L.M., 186 P-3d 164, 170 (Kan. 2oo8)
(stating that juveniles have a right to a jury trial under the state constitution).
250. See CLEMENS BARTOLLAS, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 474 (5th ed. 2000) (noting that juveniles
rarely request jury trials in states that allow juries in juvenile court).
251. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495 (2ooo) ("The degree of criminal culpability the
legislature chooses to associate with particular, factually distinct conduct has significant implications
both for a defendant's very liberty, and for the heightened stigma associated with an offense the
legislature has selected as worthy of greater punishment."); id at 5oi (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A]
'crime' includes every fact that is by law a basis for imposing or increasing punishment .... ").
252. See generally David Culberg, Note, The Accused's Bad Character: Theory and Practice, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343, 1344-46 (2009) (discussing the history and development of Federal Rule of
Evidence 404, which controls the use and introduction of character and propensity evidence).
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on its relevance to the ultimate question before the jury: whether the
defendant committed the crime for which he or she stands accused. It
supports the notion that defendants should not be convicted because
they are generally "bad" people or because they have had a checkered
past, but because the State has presented sufficient evidence to show that
at a particular moment in time the defendant broke the law. It separates
the concept of the defendant's identity, which may be relevant for
sentencing, from the crime he or she is accused of committing, which is
relevant for a determination of guilt.
On its face, Apprendi seems to adhere to this long-held notion.
Consider the facts of Apprendi itself, in which Charles Apprendi
received a "hate crime" enhancement for acting with racial animus.25
Apprendi's racial animus at the time of his crime, while certainly part of
who he is or was as a person, is also intertwined with the crime he was
accused of committing. In establishing a sentencing enhancement system
that increased a defendant's sentence if he acted out of racial hatred, the
State of New Jersey did not criminalize racism itself, but rather
criminalized racism when it is a motive for some underlying crime -here,
attempting to shoot up his neighbor's trailer and brandishing a weapon.2 54
In other words, New Jersey tacked two extra years onto Apprendi's
sentence not because he was a racist, but because he acted on his racism
and committed a crime in the process. The Supreme Court in the
Apprendi decision recognized that racism became an element of
Apprendi's crime when it was used to increase his sentence beyond the
otherwise applicable statutory maximum. It thus became something that
the state needed to prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
justify punishing Apprendi for it. In this sense, Apprendi barely crossed a
line between factors traditionally reserved for the sentencing phase and
those routinely contemplated by juries.
But this distinction between facts that indicate a defendant's guilt
and those that dictate the appropriate sentence for that guilt has never
been perfect. The enhancements imposed by the sentencing judges in
Ring, Blakely, and Cunningham based the defendant's punishment both
on facts inherent to the crime and on facts that had little or nothing to do
with the crime itself. These cases' application of Apprendi makes clear
that even those aggravators that are unrelated to the crime itself must be
proven to the jury using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.
While some of the factors considered by the courts to justify the
sentences in each of the cases were linked-like Apprendi's-to the
crime itself, some were not. In Ring, the court considered aggravators
such as the defendant's prior criminal history, his age, and whether he
253. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470-71254. Id. at 469.
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had acted in a heinous, cruel, or depraved manner.255 In Blakely, in
addition to weighing whether the defendant had acted in an especially
cruel manner, the court weighed the defendant's history of domestic
violence with the victim, including some incidents that had not been
adjudicated. 26 In Cunningham, the court weighed not only the
defendant's past conduct, but the "particular vulnerability of [his]
victim," his "violent conduct," and the future danger he posed to
society.' These factors are judgments about the defendant as a person
and how who the defendant is should affect not only his punishment but
also his guilt for the crime. The court is asked to look beyond the
moment of the crime itself and consider the defendant's life as a
continuum, judging if the moment that brought him before the court was
an aberration or part of the very fabric of the defendant as a person. In
these opinions, the Supreme Court recognized that if a state would seek
to increase a defendant's punishment for these factors, such factors
become elements of the crime the defendant has committed. Timothy
Ring was guilty of capital murder and so could be sentenced to death not
only because he was involved in a crime that ultimately resulted in
another's death, but also because he, Timothy Ring, was an adult, he had
"committed the offense in expectation of receiving something of
'pecuniary value,"' and he acted in a depraved, cruel and heinous
manner. 259 Ralph Blakely, Jr.'s sentence was increased not only because
he was guilty of kidnapping his estranged wife, but also because he had
acted in an especially cruel manner.260 John Cunningham was sentenced
to the upper term of the DSL not only because he abused a child, but
also because his victim was particularly vulnerable, he was violent, and
he posed a future danger to society.261
The Supreme Court recognized that the findings of these facts as a
means to assess appropriate punishment rendered them inseparably
linked to the underlying crimes. The men, and their particular histories
and lives, became part of the crimes for which they were convicted. And
while the Supreme Court did not require that the men's prior criminal
convictions be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt ,26 it did
subject these other facts to the full rigors of proof to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt if the defendant's sentence were to rest upon them.
255. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,594-96 (2oo2).
256. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 300-01 & n.4 (2004).
257. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-76 & n.I (2007).
258. See Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 873; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04; Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
259. Ring, 536 U.S. at 594-95.
260. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299-300.
261. Cunningham, 549 U.S. at 275.
262. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S 224, 239-47 (1998)

convictions from the requirements of Apprendi).

(exempting prior
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Applying Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings will further blur the
line separating factors that traditionally are considered in the context of
"guilt," and those that are weighed for sentencing. Factors such as
protection of the community, judicial efficiency, the sophistication of the
offender, prior commitments to juvenile facilities, and the likelihood of
rehabilitation all focus the court on facts that are external to the crime
itself and that, at least in part, are linked to the person accused of the
crime. They ask a court to judge the offender's person-his or her
history, not only criminally, but also in terms of who he or she is and how
the crime for which he or she stands accused falls in the continuum of his
or her life and within the society to which he or she may one day return.
There is something off-putting about placing this judgment of the person
before a jury who is asked to decide that person's guilt, but failing to do
so is logically inconsistent with the very notion that Apprendi, and indeed
the judicial system itself, seeks to promote. Individuals receive sentences
for their crimes. The length or severity of a sentence is weighed and
justified based on the crime for which the individual is convicted. In
order to contemplate sentencing a child as an adult, and even judging
him or her guilty as an adult, there must first be a finding that the child
warrants adult adjudication. In this sense, children who are transferred to
the adult court system are being adjudicated not only for their criminal
acts, but for their person-a person that, while occupying a body that is
biologically and chronologically a child's, is judicially guilty of failing to
remain a child and acting as an adult. In short, transferred children are
adjudicated guilty of both having broken the law and having lost the
identity and protections of childhood. As a result of this adjudication,
these children can be treated and sentenced beyond their biological
identity. Therefore, after Apprendi, this adjudication must occur before a
jury and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Another insight about courts' aversion to applying Apprendi to
juvenile transfer decisions is suggested by those courts' eagerness to label
transfer as merely "jurisdictional."2 This is a neutral label. It speaks to
the power of the court to weigh a case and reach a conclusion. It conjures
images of a physical place-a room in a particular city or state, where a
court, having been properly convened, can pass judgment on the
individuals who stand before it. Men and women are not sentenced or
harmed by a designation of jurisdiction alone. Whatever harm may befall
a defendant as a result of a criminal charge comes later, long after the
establishment of jurisdiction, with conviction and sentencing.
Jurisdiction, for all its importance, is a starting place that is frequently
uncontested and barely noted in a proceeding.

263. See supra part III.A.

November 2oo9]

RETHINKING TRANSFER HEARINGS

217

Applying Apprendi to juvenile transfer decisions removes it from
this neutral realm and changes the game by placing the findings
necessary for transfer before a jury as elements of the offense. To the
extent that Apprendi lays bare what courts do when they enhance a
defendant's sentence, applying Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings
lays bare what a judge does when he or she removes a child from the
juvenile court system; the judge strips the child of his or her identity and
shrouds him or her in a legal fiction whereby he or she ceases to be who
he or she is and becomes an adult, subject to all the responsibilities,
rigors, and consequences of adulthood with none of the benefits. This is a
hard thing for even the most stalwart of judges to face.
This recasting of a defendant into another identity is not done in any
other context. Women are not "transferred" to be tried as men when
their crimes fly in the face of what society expects from women.264 The
wealthy are not "transferred" to be tried as the underprivileged when
their crimes seem uncharacteristic of their social class. Anglos are not
"transferred" to be tried as persons of color when their crimes are
statistically anomalous to their race. Instead we try the defendant as he
or she comes-man or woman, rich or poor, black or white. We thus
recognize that social expectations or statistics are not always accurate,
that all people are capable of crime and punishment and redemption and
that the system must recognize it all."' The criminalization of the act is
not linked to the expectations of the actor. In theory, at least, criminal
acts incur equal culpability no matter who commits them." Their racial,
socioeconomic, or gender identity is a distinction that makes no
difference to the criminal court. But because the states have created a
separate judicial system that acknowledges and embraces a difference in
264. See generally, e.g., Jenny E. Carroll, Note, Images of Women and Capital Sentencing Among
Female Offenders: Exploring the Outer Limits of the Eighth Amendment and Articulated Theories of
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1413 (1997).
265. This is not to say that there is not inequity in the system. Certain defendants are more likely
to be stopped, arrested, charged, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced in certain ways based on their
gender, stcioeconomic, or racial status. Studies confirm that justice, for all its characterizations, is not
blind but highly cognizant of the men and women who appear before it. See EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA &
MICHAEL A. JONES, NAT'L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME 15-16 (2o0o),
available at http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/justiceforsome/jfs.pdf (noting racial disparities
throughout the criminal justice process and the disproportionate representation of racial minorities in
the criminal system). But that discussion is for another article.
266. There are certainly disparities in the application of criminal statutes, and it could also be
argued that the very decision to criminalize particular acts is frequently motivated by social
expectations about race, class, and/or gender. As Justice Stevens famously noted, the brunt of federal
penalties fall on black defendants. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 479-80 (1995)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that while sixty-five percent of those who use crack cocaine are white,
they represent only four percent of federal offenders, leaving persons of color to absorb the
significantly higher federal sentences for possession and distribution of crack cocaine). A full
exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
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culpability for the identity of child versus that of adult, to transfer a child
out of the juvenile system, the court must do more than designate the
physical place where the trial will take place. It must actually alter who
the defendant-the child-is. Placing this process in the context of the
Apprendi case line forces the court to face the fiction it has internalized
and for which it has become the vehicle.26 It forces the court to
acknowledge not only what it is doing-taking a child and throwing him
or her into a system that is not designed to accommodate his or her
immaturity-but also what the consequences of that action will be; the
"child" will cease to exist and in his or her place a legally constructed
"adult-child" will face an adult charge and an adult sentence. It
acknowledges that there is a significance to the child's identity, as child
or adult, that the court fails to attach to any other identity.
The creation of this legal fiction takes on another dimension because
it involves a child. We as a society, after all, value childhood enough to
create, constitutionally unbidden, separate systems to adjudicate the guilt
of children. To transfer children out of that system is to acknowledge not
only that the system has failed but that we must create a new identity for
these people we can no longer embrace as a child. Is it easier for judges
to ignore all of this by refusing to apply Apprendi and, instead, couching
the question of transfer in the almost physical terms of jurisdiction? Is
the question more constitutionally and socially palatable if the judge is
merely deciding what room this child should stand trial in, not what the
consequences of standing in that room will be?
Yet another possible explanation for the reluctance of courts to
apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings is that such an application
creates a conflict for the courts. The "element" such a court would add to
justify the higher sentence is the element of being a child who is
incapable of reform. This suggests not only that the system to handle
juvenile offenders is deficient (something many would readily
acknowledge), but also that what the court is "criminalizing" is the
condition of being an unruly or irredeemable child. Courts are, after all,
basing decisions to transfer juveniles on factors including their lack of
amenability to the juvenile rehabilitative process and the shocking nature
of the crime they are alleged to have committed."" This criminalization of
a child's personality or his or her condition would not sit well
constitutionally. In 1962, the Supreme Court made clear that mere
conditions, no matter the "vicious evils" which may accompany them,
267. See generally Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. I6OI (1986) (discussing
the need for judges to insulate themselves from the violence they mete out).
268. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67 (1966) (laying out factual findings to support
transfer of juveniles to the adult court system, including the seriousness and violent nature of the
offense and the prospects of rehabilitation of the juvenile).
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cannot be criminalized. 6Transfer, however, would seem to do just that,
insofar as it allows a child to be tried and punished as an adult because
he or she can no longer be accommodated within a system that is
designed to treat and rehabilitate children.o
V. OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS
There is no coherent way to evade Apprendi's requirements where a
juvenile transferred to adult court receives a sentence in excess of what
he or she could have received in juvenile court."' This is not to say that
application of Apprendi to the juvenile system is not without its pitfalls
and risks. Beyond those noted by other scholars and courts regarding the
dangers juries may pose to juvenile offenders,'72 other aspects of the
juvenile justice system raise difficult questions that are not necessarily
resolved by the Supreme Court's current case law.
A. No HARM, No FOUL?
One question is the precise role of Apprendi in situations where the
offender may be exposed to a potentially higher sentence as a result of
transfer but where the actual sentence imposed upon conviction in adult
court is within the juvenile standard sentencing range. New Mexico's
statutory scheme, for example, provides that even if a juvenile is
transferred to adult court, the sentencing judge still has the option to
sentence him or her under the juvenile sentencing structure if the judge
finds that such a sentence more appropriately addresses either the
269. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 667-68 (1962) (striking down a California statute
that attempted to combat the "vicious evils" that accompany narcotics trafficking by criminalizing the
condition of being a drug addict).
270. Ironically, in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-75
(2005), the Court examined the significance of the identity of being a minor on a defendant's eligibility
for a death sentence. The Court concluded that, given the fundamental biological and neurobiological
differences between adults and children, a defendant could not be found to be sufficiently culpable to
receive the death penalty for crimes he or she committed as a child. See id. To do so would be to
impose an unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment on the child for a condition he or she
could not avoid-youth. See id. In this sense, the identity of being a child, regardless of how unruly the
child, was immutable and could not be circumvented for the sake of the highest sentence possible.
Again, this may raise questions regarding the constitutionality of transfer hearings in general, which
not only seek to alter the identity of childhood and punish the condition of being an unruly child but
may also constitute a cruel and unusual punishment as raised in Roper. See Adam Liptak, Defining
'Cruel and Unusual Punishment' When the Offender Is 13, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at A12 (discussing
case of Joe Sullivan, who at thirteen was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after
conviction in an adult court; Sullivan is challenging the sentence and conviction under the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
67, 216 P-3d 8to (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (Sutin, J.,
271. See State v. Rudy B., 2oo9 NMCA 104,
specially concurring), cert. granted, No. 31,909 (N.M. Sept. 15, 2009), available at http://
(concluding that other courts' decisions
www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2oo9/o9ca-bo4
refusing to apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings cannot be distinguished "on any rationale
other than that the cases were not correctly decided" (citing this Article)).
272. See, e.g., Feld, supra note ii, at 1221-22.
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offense itself or the needs or circumstances of the offender.' At least
hypothetically, it would also be possible for an adult court judge, acting
within the adult sentencing guidelines, to sentence a minor offender to a
sentence that does not fall outside the maximum sentence contemplated
by the juvenile sentencing scheme. In either of these two scenarios, the
offender has not received a sentence beyond the otherwise applicable
statutory maximum and, therefore, Apprendi arguably has not been
violated.274
Where no higher sentence is imposed, is there nonetheless a harm
that results from the transfer itself sufficient to warrant increased
procedural protections? If Apprendi's total sentence with the hate-crime
enhancement had been within the ten-year maximum for the underlying
offense, or if Ring were not sentenced to death despite the finding of a
statutory aggravator, or if Blakely or Cunningham had not ultimately
received an exceptional sentence, would the exposure to these higher
sentences-the mere risk-be sufficient to warrant due process
protections of a jury and a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt?
This question of what degree of exposure to a higher sentence
triggers Apprendi-style protections has not been explicitly reached by the
Supreme Court, and it is unlikely to see review given the fact that a
defendant who ultimately evades the higher sentence despite the use of
sub-Apprendi procedures has little reason to complain to any higher
court. In Cunningham, the Court spoke in terms of exposure as opposed
to only the imposed sentence,275 but of course the Court was considering
a case in which a higher sentence had in fact been imposed. Despite this
arguable ambiguity, consideration of other procedural protections
suggest that the mere exposure, no matter how tenuous, is sufficient to
trigger the protections."7 In the context of other procedural protections,
the end result of the process does not, by itself, eliminate the need for
protections. A defendant's rights to timely appointment of counsel or a
speedy trial, for example, trigger prior to the defendant's conviction. To
hinge such procedural rights on the outcome of the hearing would not
273. See Rudy B., 2oo9 NMCA 104, 1 42-44.
274. Vannella, supra note 19, at 763 (correctly noting that factors that reduce a defendant's

sentence are not covered by Apprendi).
275. Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 279-42 (2o07)
276. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2o85 (2oo9) (providing the latest in a long line of
pronouncements that "once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the Sixth Amendment
guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel present at all critical stages of the criminal
proceedings"). Interrogation by the State is such a stage. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S.
201, 204-07 (1964); see also, e.g., United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. s8o, 19o (1984) ("Our speedy trial
cases hold that that Sixth Amendment right may attach before an indictment and as early as the time
(quoting United States v. MacDonald, 456
of 'arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge.
U.S. 1, 6-7 (1982))).
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only seem illogical, but would seem to create judicial inefficiency,
particularly if the procedure had to be revisited as a result of the
conviction. In the context of juvenile transfer hearings, the question is
slightly more nuanced: when is a defendant entitled to raise Apprendi in
the context of a series of hearings whose effect on the defendant's overall
sentence will not be realized until well after the conclusion of the hearing
itself and potentially in another court? Given the Court's admonition in
Kent that procedural protections must be triggered before transfer, 77
there is a strong argument that Apprendi-style protections must be
realized during the transfer proceeding for they are "too little too late"
after transfer has occurred.
B.

APPRENDI AND THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF ADULT
CONVICTIONS

A second outstanding question is whether Apprendi is triggered by
the collateral consequences that adult convictions can have on sentences
for future crimes. This returns us to the question whether there is
something unique about the juvenile system, such that mere exposure to
the adult system, or conviction or sentence in that system, is sufficient to
trigger increased due process protections regardless of whether the
incarceration portion of the minor's sentence following transfer is within
that contemplated by the juvenile sentencing structure. There are
certainly differences between juvenile and adult convictions that extend
beyond "mere" incarceration. In nearly all jurisdictions, juvenile
adjudications do not "score" as severely as adult convictions in
determining placement on the sentencing grid for future offenses-if
they score at all."' In real terms, this means that juveniles who are
transferred to adult court and are subsequently convicted of additional
crimes will receive higher sentences than juveniles who were not
transferred. In addition, many jurisdictions have "once transferred,
always transferred" statutes. 9 These statutes require that once a juvenile
is transferred to adult court, any subsequent proceedings against that
offender must also occur in adult court, regardless of whether the
subsequent offense is independently suitable for transfer and regardless

277. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966).

278. Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Striking Out on the First Pitch in Criminal Court, i

BARRY

L. REV. 7, 8-

17 (2ooo) (noting that, in most jurisdictions, adjudication of guilt in juvenile court either does not

count as a "criminal" conviction and therefore is not scored for adult sentencing purposes, or is scored
at a lower or "capped" rate in adult court).
279. See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE
RESPONSES TO SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME 5 (1996) (noting that eighteen states have "once

transferred, always transferred" statutes that prevent offenders from returning to juvenile court once
they have been transferred to adult court regardless of whether the adult court transfer resulted in an
actual conviction).
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of whether the offense for which the juvenile was originally transferred
ultimately resulted in a conviction.
Thus, the mere fact of transfer can close the juvenile system forever
to a child offender. The specter of indeterminate sentencing and threestrikes sentencing enhancements, which loom in many jurisdictions' adult
sentencing guidelines, '81 further complicates the calculus. Few
jurisdictions score juvenile adjudications of guilt toward a defendant's
strike count."' In addition, indeterminate sentencing statutes provide
that even when a judge sentences an offender within the adult sentencing
guidelines below or at the same level as the offender would have
received in the juvenile system, a parole or subsequent sentencing board
may determine at a later date that an increased sentence for an
indeterminate length is appropriate for those sentenced under the adult
system only. While most juvenile sentencing schemes allow the juvenile
facility to determine the appropriate length of the sentence within a
designated range, few jurisdictions extend such sentences beyond the age
of majority or age twenty-one." In this sense, adult convictions that
appear to conform to the juvenile sentencing range may in fact subject
280. See id.

281. See Caleb Durling, Comment, Never Going Home: Does It Make Us Safer? Does It Make
Sense? Sex Offenders, Residency Restrictions, and Reforming Risk Management Law, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 317, 353-56 (2oo6) (discussing the rising use and impact of indeterminate sentencing);
Douglas A. Berman, The Enduring (and Again Timely) Wisdom of the Original MPC Sentencing
Provisions, 61 FLA. L. REv. 709, 723-24 (2009) (discussing trends towards harsher sentencing through
the use of three-strike provisions and indeterminate sentencing); Brendan O'Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi,
Why Have Robberies Become Less Frequent but More Violent?, 25 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 518, 526 (2009)
(quantifying the rise of three-strike provisions state by state).
282. California's "Three Strikes" sentencing law is one of the few that allows juvenile
adjudications to count as strike offenses, even though such adjudications occur without a jury. See CAL.
PENAL CODE § 667 (West 1999); Feld, supra note II, at 1208-09 (discussing California's willingness to
rely on juvenile adjudications to serve as a basis for three-strike sentencing); Sanborn, supra note 278,
at 24 (noting that only California, Louisiana, and Texas allow juvenile adjudications to serve as
"strikes" and even these states do not allow a juvenile to acquire a final strike prior to transfer to adult
court). It is interesting to note that in People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 951-55 (Cal. 2oo9), the
defendant did not dispute that his prior juvenile conviction qualified as a strike under California's
statute but he claimed that use of such a conviction to secure his life sentence, which he would not
have been eligible for without considering the juvenile conviction, violated his Sixth Amendment right
as the juvenile conviction was secured without a jury in juvenile court. The California court rejected
this argument and allowed the conviction to stand undisturbed. Id. at 951-55.
283. See generally Gary L. Mason, Indeterminate Sentencing: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, or
Just Plain Cruel?, 16 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 89 ('990) (providing a broad
discussion of indeterminate sentencing in the adult court system).
284. Mary M. Prescott, Another Option for Older, Nonviolent Juveniles: Statutory Retention of
Juvenile Court Jurisdiction Past the Age of Majority, 85 IOWA L. REV. 997, ioo6 (2000) (noting that
while individual states set their own age of majority, most states set juvenile court jurisdiction between
seventeen and twenty-one years of age); Lisa S. Beresford, Note, Is Lowering the Age at Which
Juveniles Can Be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State by State
Assessment, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 799 (2000) (noting that the juvenile court's capacity to punish is
limited by the jurisdictional limitation of the age of the offender).
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the offender to a higher sentence under an indeterminate sentencing
scheme. In addition, as explained above, adult convictions may have
long-term effects on future sentencings that juvenile adjudications do
not, regardless of whether the sentence the offender receives as a result
of the transfer is in fact longer than the sentence that he or she might
have received in juvenile court.
Juvenile adjudications also differ from adult convictions in terms of
other collateral consequences. In forty-seven jurisdictions, an adult
felony conviction will result in the suspension of the right to vote but
forty-five of those jurisdictions hold that juvenile adjudications do not
affect suffrage. 286 Other collateral consequences may vary from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction but if recent trends in sentencing hold true, it
is clear that while sentencing commissions may be willing to reduce
periods of confinement and increase good time allotments, they are also
imposing greater collateral restrictions on felons convicted in adult court,
as opposed to offenders adjudicated in juvenile court."7 In Witkowski v.
M.D.N., the North Dakota Supreme Court noted: "Trying a juvenile as
an adult is a severe sanction with harsh consequences. The status of
'juvenile' carries a shield from publicity, protection against extended pretrial detention and post-conviction incarceration with adults, and
guarantees that confinement will not exceed the age of twenty."2"' The
North Dakota court added that, just as with adults convicted as felons,
juveniles convicted as adults are disqualified from public employment
and may have restrictions placed on other legitimate opportunities.2"9
285. Beresford, supra note 284, at 817-18 (noting that it is common for juveniles to receive less
confinement once transferred to adult court than they would have received had the juvenile court
retained jurisdiction).
286. Sanborn, supra note 278, at 8-I; see C. Victor Lander, Racism in the Criminal Justice System
2 Ann. 2ooo ATLA-CLE I8oi (2000) (commenting that while juvenile adjudications do not result in
disenfranchisement, once a juvenile is convicted of a felony offense, if sentenced as an adult as a result
of transfer, the juvenile loses his or her right to vote before he or she has even gained that right); Brian
Pinaire et al., Barred from the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30
FORDAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1520-21 (2003) (noting that forty-eight states either restrict or entirely revoke
the right of felons to vote); see also United States Department of Justice Civil Rights Division,
Regaining Your Right to Vote, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/restore vote.php (last visited Oct. 4,
2oo9) (providing state-by-state analysis of disenfranchisement statutes); MARGARET COLGATE LOVE &
SUSAN M. KUZMA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILmTES OF CONVICTED FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE
SURVEY (1996) (same).
287. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of "Sexually Violent Predators,"93 MINN. L. REv. 670,
701-02 & n.155 (2oo8) ("In conjunction with the exponential increase in the number and length of
incarcerative sentences during the last two decades, collateral sentencing consequences have
contributed to exiling ex-offenders within their country, even after expiration of their maximum
sentences." (quoting Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
CollateralSentencing Consequences, II STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 153, 154 (1999))).
288. 493 N.W.2d 68o, 683 (N.D. 1992).
289. Id. For a more general discussion, see also Marsha B. Freeman,

Bringing Up Baby
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From the perspective of Apprendi, the question becomes whether
these collateral losses of liberty interests are worthy of heightened due
process protection. In other words, do they warrant the same level of
protection afforded the ultimate liberty-physical freedom? While
Apprendi and its progeny consider "liberty" in terms of heightened
physical impositions (additional years of incarceration in Apprendi,
Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham, and execution in Rings), nothing in
the rulings themselves explicitly requires that a defendant must be
subjected to a "greater punishment" in terms of confinement in order to
warrant the due process protections of a jury and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. While some collateral interests may not rise to a
constitutional level, it seems difficult to distinguish the "collateral"
suspension of the right to vote from physical confinement on a
constitutional scale of worth. In this sense, even if an offender's ultimate
period of confinement following an adult conviction after transfer is not
greater than that he or she would have received if adjudicated guilty in
juvenile court, the mere fact of the adult conviction and the collateral
consequences it carries arguably require the protections provided by
Apprendi because these consequences cannot be imposed without the
factual finding that led to the transfer.

C. How WOULD

AN APPRENDI HEARING LOOK IN JUVENILE COURT?

Assuming that courts begin to enforce (or are compelled by higher
courts to enforce) Apprendi in the context of juvenile transfer hearings,
legitimate questions remain about precisely what such hearings would
look like. Apprendi answers the basic question that the burden of proof
must be beyond a reasonable doubt, but what of the jury requirement?
Given that juries do not preside over the ultimate question of guilt in the
juvenile system,'9 are they required to preside over the question of
whether an offender should remain in the system?" Do juveniles gain or
lose something in allowing a judge, not a jury (which by definition could
not contain the offender's peers, at least not in terms of age), to review

(Criminals): The Failure of Zero Tolerance and the Need for a Multidisciplinary Approach to State
Actions Involving Children, 21 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 533, 555-56 (2002), which notes that offenders
transferred to adult court suffer collateral consequences of the transfer. These consequences can
include the loss of confidentiality, which in some jurisdictions accompanies juvenile adjudications, and
disqualification from public employment. Id.
290. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 56o (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that
there is no constitutional requirement of a jury in juvenile cases).
291. This issue was addressed by the New Mexico Court of Appeals in Rudy B., where the court
concluded that Apprendi applied to juvenile amenability determinations despite the absence of juries
in juvenile court because such a determination sought to transfer the juvenile to the adult court
system, where the juvenile would enjoy the procedural rights of an adult, "including the jury trial
right." See 2oo9 NMCA 104, 24, 216 P.3d 8'1o (N.M. Ct. App. 2oo9), cert. granted, No. 31,909 (N.M.
Sept. 15,2oo9), availableat httpJ/www.nmcompcomm.us/nmcases/NMCA/2oo9/o9ca-bo4.
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such factors as their amenability to rehabilitation?"' Such an argumentthat juveniles may actually be worse off if a jury is allowed to determine
transfer-is often put forth not only in the juvenile context, but also by
those who believe that a jury should not make a determination of death
in capital cases.293 On this line of reasoning, there is a risk that, in the face
of the horrific crime for which the defendant is charged -or in the case of
juveniles, the youth of the offender coupled with the horrific crimejuries will overlook or minimize the social considerations that a sentencer
should take into account.
In the context of juvenile transfer hearings there is also the
additional complication that, unlike capital cases, a jury weighing the
question of juvenile transfer would potentially do so before the offender
was actually judged guilty-at the time the State sought to transfer him
or her to adult court. If the same jury weighs both transfer and guilt, this
question of timing would raise two primary quandaries for the offender
in presenting his or her case. First, much of the "social" evidence
presented in the context of the transfer hearing would likely be excluded
for the adjudicatory portion of the proceeding because it has little or no
relevance to the offender's guilt, even though such evidence may be
relevant to the juvenile's propensity for the crime or the need for
punishment. Factors such as the offender's criminal history, history of
learning disabilities or mental illness, lack of appropriate role models, or
history of foster homes may serve a juvenile well in the context of a
transfer hearing to persuade a fact finder that, if given a chance, he or
See Feld,supra note ii, at 1222.
293. See id. at 1161-69 (discussing the differences between judicial determination of facts and jury
determination of facts); id. at 1222 (concluding that one unwanted consequence of allowing juveniles
juries in the transfer context would be "to exclude more categories of offenses from juvenile court
jurisdictions" in the interests of streamlining the process). The analogy in capital cases is race studies
of juries, which find that juries that contain few or no representatives of the of the defendant's race are
far more likely to sentence the defendant to death. See, e.g., Katherine Barnes et al., Place Matters
(Most): An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Decision-Making in Death-Eligible Cases, 51 ARIz. L.
REV. 305, 327 (2oo9) (concluding that prosecutors make charging decisions based on, among other
things, the racial composition of the jury pool, with pools containing large percentages of people of
color being less likely to impose death sentences); Craig Haney, Commonsense Justice and Capital
Punishment: Problematizing the "Will of the People," 3 PsYcHoL. PuB. POL'Y & L. 303, 330 (1997)
(noting that white jurors are far more likely to impose death sentences on African American
defendants than on white defendants). The larger question of whether judges or juries generally are
more likely to impose death remains in dispute. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan,
Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital
Cases, 75 B.U. L. REv. 759, 793-95 (1995) (discussing studies that show a correlation between
upcoming elections and judicial overrides of jury recommendations against imposing the death
penalty); Fred B. Burnside, Comment, Dying to Get Elected: A Challenge to the Jury Override, 1999
Wis. L. REv. 107,Io39-44 (same). The question whether juveniles would actually be better off with a
jury or a judge deciding transfer is a different question than whether they enjoy the right to such a jury
under the Apprendi case line. It is a question certainly worthy of examination, but sadly not in this
Article.
292.
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she is redeemable-but the same factors may prejudice a jury against the
same juvenile in the context of adjudication by suggesting that he or she
has little direction other than lawlessness. Coupled with recent trends
that move juvenile justice systems away from a rehabilitative model and
towards a punitive one that requires the offender to accept
"responsibility," presentation of such factors may have a significant
impact on the jury's decision to transfer and/or on decisions of guilt."
Second, if asked to present evidence to the same jury regarding
transfer and guilt, an offender may have to choose between inconsistent
theories of defense. In capital proceedings, for example, it is not unusual
for defendants to argue their lack of guilt to a jury in the guilt phase of a
proceeding and then, upon conviction, to present evidence of their
remorse following the crime or to suggest that their mental health or
intellect affected their decision-making process, thereby warranting
mercy in the sentencing phase. Such inconsistent theories would not be
possible if the sequence of the hearings were reversed. In capital cases, a
defendant can argue that the jury, having found him or her guilty, should
now consider the factors surrounding the crime itself and the defendant
to arrive at the appropriate sentence. In a transfer hearing, however, the
offender has not yet been found guilty but may want the fact finder to
consider such facts as his or her ability to understand the alleged crime or
his or her behavior following the alleged crime, while later arguing that
the state either cannot prove his or her guilt or that he or she is in fact
not guilty.
The most obvious response to these concerns is that the right to a
jury is distinct from a defendant's decision to exercise that right. The fact
that a defendant may ultimately chose to waive his or her right to a jury
does not diminish the constitutional guarantee to that jury. Just as adult
defendants waive jury trial when they believe that a jury may be unable
or unwilling to provide them with a fair trial,295 a juvenile could employ
the same calculus in determining whether or not he or she wanted a jury
to decide transfer. The waiver of the jury on this particular issue would
not preclude the same juvenile offender from seeking a jury to adjudicate
guilt if he or she was ultimately transferred.296
294. Prescott, supra note 284, at ioo8 (noting recent trends away from leniency in juvenile courts
including increasing numbers of transferable cases).
295. See generally, Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 ('930) (permitting waiver of jury trial
in federal criminal cases). Such a right of waiver could be conditioned on the consent of the
prosecuting attorney or judge. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). Singer did not reach
the question of whether a defendant's reasons for wanting to be tried by judge alone could be "so
compelling that the Government's insistence on trial by jury would result in the denial to a defendant
of an impartial trial." Id. at 37.
296. In discussing the right to waive jury trial, the Court in Patton acknowledged the ability of
defendants to engage in partial waiver of the jury. 281 U.S. at 312. This partial waiver frequently
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Another solution to this dilemma would be to separate the jurieshave one jury consider the offender's guilt and a separate jury consider
his or her suitability to transfer. This is consistent with some capital
sentencing schemes, which allow separate juries to consider guilt and
punishment." Another possible solution would be to allow a judge to
make an initial decision regarding the appropriateness of transfer and
then, if a juvenile is both transferred and convicted in adult court, allow
the jury to consider either whether or not the original transfer was
appropriate or, similar to the New Mexico model, to consider whether
the offender should be sentenced within the adult or juvenile sentencing
schemes.
This second solution, arguably, complies with the literal holding of
Apprendi, in that increased procedural protections would be triggered
once the juvenile was actually facing a higher sentence, i.e. after he or
she had already been both transferred to and convicted in adult court.
This solution, however, is not without faults. First, it is judicially
inefficient. One of the Kent factors is judicial efficiency, which might be
served, for example, by permitting transfer when the juvenile's case is
joined with those of adult codefendants.t In this sense, conducting two
proceedings to determine the appropriateness of transfer makes little
sense and seems a poor use of judicial resources.
Second, this solution requires presentation of social factors to a jury
that has just found the offender guilty of the crime. It is not clear what
effect this finding might have on the jury's subsequent proceedings. What
is clear is that there is a risk that jurors would allow information from the
guilt phase of the trial to impermissibly bleed into their decisions about
either transfer or the appropriate sentencing system for the juvenile."'
An additional concern is that a jury, hearing that a judge had already
determined that transfer was appropriate or simply assuming that
manifests in the context of capital cases, in which a defendant may waive trial by jury for the guilt
portion of his proceeding, but decline to waive jury for the punishment portion. See Commonwealth v.
O'Donnell, 74o A.2d 198, 213 (Pa. 1999) (acknowledging the right of capital defendants to waive their
right to jury trial for a portion of the proceedings); Commonwealth v. Michael, 674 A.2d o44, o46 n.4
(Pa. 1996).
297. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)(2)(C) (2oo6) (allowing a defendant a separate sentencing jury under
certain circumstances in capital cases); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(5)(b) (2oo4) (same); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:I1-3(c)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009) (same); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(2) (McKinney
2oo5) (same); see also Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death: Guilt Is
Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011,
;o6o-6i (2001) (arguing that there should always be separate sentencing juries in capital cases given
that a jury only reaches sentencing after having already committed to the prosecutor's version of the
facts).
298. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-68 (1966).
299. See Casey Laffey, Note. The Death Penalty and the Sixth Amendment: How Will the System
Look After Ring v. Arizona?, 77 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 371, 398 (2003) ("[A] jury might be more likely
than a judge to impose the death penalty improperly based on emotion.").
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someone had already determined that transfer was appropriate, might
treat that previous determination with inappropriate deference in
making their own decision about either transfer or sentencing."
Third, adopting the New Mexico model, which would allow the jury
to decide whether the offender should be sentenced in the adult or
juvenile systems, ignores the collateral consequences that may stem from
an adult conviction. If the State can argue that the length of incarceration
is the sole trigger for Apprendi-style protections, can the State agree not
to seek a sentence in excess of the maximum term of incarceration
allowed under the juvenile sentencing scheme, while still requesting a
transfer to adult court in order to achieve collateral consequences (such
as a higher offender score or sentencing under a three-strike provision
from the adult conviction) that it could not achieve via a juvenile
adjudication? If so, the State could do an end run around the procedural
protections afforded by Apprendi simply by limiting itself on the
requested period of incarceration. Moreover, there would remain the
possibility that the court would decline to follow the State's
recommendation and proceed to sentence a transferred juvenile above
the sentence he or she would have received in juvenile court, in which
case the entire conviction might have to be thrown out under Apprendi
because the offender had received a higher sentence without due process
protections. Blakely makes clear that Apprendi is implicated even if the
state promises not to pursue a higher sentence because the court might
nonetheless impose one.30 ' In other words, it would not have made a
difference if the State at sentencing asked the court to find Apprendi
guilty of a hate crime but to sentence him within the basic statutory
maximum of ten years because the judge could still have imposed a
sentence above ten years under the sentencing guidelines. A defendant
300. Arguably this risk of inappropriate deference could be diminished with a jury instruction,
similar to those given to jurors advising that the state's decision to charge a defendant should not
weigh in their determination of guilt, or that a judge's ruling on evidentiary issues should not affect
their decision. The curative effect of such instructions, however, is difficult to judge, particularly given
that in this instance, unlike the examples given, the question before the jury is exactly, not
approximately, the issue previously decided-whether this juvenile should be transferred and treated
as an adult in the eyes of the law.
It is also possible that, unless a jury was told that a judge had already made a determination
on transfer, the jury would have no idea that the issue was already decided. In this sense, a risk of
deference might be avoided by simply not informing a jury of the judge's previous decision. Another
safeguard against deference would be to present the relevant transfer factors as sentencing factors.
The risk in this is it assumes to some extent that a jury is ignorant of the system, a difficult assumption
to test, but an important one if the defense wishes to avoid impermissible deference by the jury. It
might be possible to deal with this issue during the voir dire process by questioning jurors' knowledge
of the system, or of the defendant's age, but even if such questions were posed in the form of a
confidential questionnaire, it would still pose the risk of inadvertently educating the jury about the
very information the defense is seeking to avoid.
301. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,303 (2oo4).
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does not have to wait for the violation to occur for his or her Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to trigger.
A fourth dilemma raised by allowing a jury to consider the
appropriateness of transfer after the fact is suggested by the Court's
decision in Kent: due process rights provided after a juvenile has already
been removed from the juvenile system are not sufficient because the
juvenile has already suffered a harm by virtue of the removal itself. In
Kent, the Court noted that juvenile court is fundamentally different than
adult court and may offer services and protections that cannot be
duplicated in adult court even if due process protections are met with
respect to the ultimate duration of the criminal sentence.3 2 Later, in
McKeiver, the Supreme Court distinguished the juvenile court system
from the adult court system as providing a more protective and
rehabilitative environment, both pre- and postadjudication. " For
purposes of Apprendi, the question remains whether these benefits
warrant the same level of due process protections as a higher sentence.
While Kent holds that an offender is entitled to his or her transfer
hearing prior to removal from juvenile court,3 4 the Court does not assign
a specific constitutional value to the juvenile court experience. Despite
the Kent Court's lack of guidance, this question seems to hinge on
whether juvenile court is unique and, once statutorily created, creates
some level of expectation for adjudication that cannot be denied without
an appropriate level of constitutional protections. Any effort to remove
the minor from the juvenile system, in and of itself, represents an effort
to achieve a higher and more retributive, as opposed to rehabilitative,
sentence, thereby triggering the protections articulated in Apprendi. A
hearing following this removal would therefore be insufficient, as it
would be merely a post-hoc effort to ameliorate a harm already exacted
on the offender when he or she was removed from the juvenile system.
This is, admittedly, a more difficult argument to make under Apprendi
because it assumes that pre-adjudicatory effects of transfer rise to the
same level as a sentence in excess of the otherwise applicable statutory
maximum. The Court has yet to resolve this issue.
CONCLUSION

The application of Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings raises a
number of unique considerations, particularly in light of the fact that
transfer hearings have a variety of consequences for their juvenile
subjects. One such impact is to potentially expose the offender to a
higher sentence in the adult system than he or she would receive in the
302. 383 U.S. at 563-64.
303. 403 U.S. 528, 539-40, 544 (1971) (plurality opinion).
304. 383 U.S. 541, 552-53 (1966).
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juvenile system. In its most basic application, Apprendi requires that
findings resulting in such higher sanctions be supported by a jury
determination made beyond a reasonable doubt. But Apprendi's impact
on other consequences of juvenile transfer proceedings is not as obvious.
Clearly, transfer hearings have a variety of collateral consequences, both
procedural and substantive, even if they do not result in an increased
period of incarceration for the offender. It is less clear whether
Apprendi's protections apply to such collateral impacts. Arguably,
Apprendi requires heightened procedural protections whenever a liberty
interest is at stake, although it is not clear under current Supreme Court
case law what particular protections are necessary when the liberty
interest is not physical detention.
Thus, the holding in Apprendi does not directly undermine Kent,
except to the extent that the result of a Kent hearing is to impose on an
offender a sentence beyond the statutory maximum he or she would
otherwise face. However, by making "effect" rather than "form" the
focus of the constitutional inquiry, Apprendi and its progeny set a new
standard for procedural protections, requiring a jury and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt whenever the particular findings considered result in a
higher sentence, regardless of the context in which those findings occur.
In defining an appropriate level of process, the Court in Kent was loath
to attach specific parameters to the fundamental due process it required
in transfer hearings. The Court's subsequent decisions in Apprendi, Ring,
Blakely, Booker, and Cunningham, however, may demand that due
process protections in juvenile transfer hearings take on specific formdetermination by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt-that every state but
two currently fails to provide.
As the debate over the contours of Apprendi rages on, so inevitably
do questions about the formal role and function of the jury.3 5 And as
courts at all levels struggle to define the outer limits of Apprendi,
questions about the effect, or even the wisdom, of expanding the jury's
role into the ever-widening sphere of sentencing inevitably emerge."" At
a minimum, Apprendi seeks to impose some of the constitutional
protections of determinations of guilt on the more consequential findings
of sentencing." In the process, it reopens questions about the status of
constitutional procedural protections in juvenile court. As the Court has
struggled since Gault to find a proper balance between the reformist

305. For the latest in this debate see generally W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel.
Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 893 (2009).
3o6. See Douglas A. Berman, Should Juries Be the Guide for Adventures Through ApprendiLand?, 1o9 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 65, 65-72 (2oo9), http://www.columbialawreview.orglarticles/
should-juries-be-the-guide-for-adventures-through-i-apprendi-i--land.
307. Id. at70-71.
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goals of the juvenile justice system and the procedural protections of the
Constitution, the stakes have grown higher. Children, particularly
underprivileged children and children of color, are being transferred out
of the juvenile court systems at alarming rates and with shocking ease.3o
In the adult court system, they are facing longer sentences, harsher
conditions of incarceration, and greater collateral consequences. Given
the enormous consequences that flow from transfer, a greater level of
procedural protection seems warranted. The Court's decision in Roper v.
Simmons' and acceptance of the petitions for certiorari in Sullivan v.
State "o and Graham v. State"' suggest an increased willingness to
reconsider the recasting of juveniles as adults for the purposes of
criminal sentencing. While none of these cases have been based on
Apprendi's analysis, they suggest increased scrutiny over juvenile
transfer and the accompanying sentencing process. It seems
constitutionally implausible that a higher standard of proof is required to
convict a juvenile for a misdemeanor offense than to send him or her out
of the juvenile court system to face an adult conviction and sentence. Yet
failing to apply Apprendi to juvenile transfer hearings has just such an
effect. Apprendi could not have been clearer: when determining the
scope of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments' protections, "the
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect."3 " This command leaves
courts no choice but to extend those protections to juvenile transfer
hearings.
308. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 59 (indicating that in states studied,
African American children charged with violent offenses are transferred at 1.8 to 3.1 times the rate of
white children charged with these crimes); Montr6 D. Carodine, "The Mis-Characterization of the
Negro": A Race Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521, 577 (2oo9)
("Nationwide studies also show that while '[Blacks] represent 15% of the population, [they represent]
26% of juvenile arrests, 44% of youth who are detained, 46% of the youth who are judicially waived to
[adult] criminal court, and 58% of the youth admitted to state prisons.' ... One study of eighteen
jurisdictions found that eighty-two percent of transfers to the adult system were of minority youth and
seventy percent of the transferred youth in particular were Black." (alterations in original) (footnote
omitted) (quoting CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RACE AND THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM);
Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 951, 989 (2oo6)); Marcy
Rasmussen Pokopacz & Barry C. Feld, Judicial Waiver Policy and Practice: Persistence, Seriousness
and Race, 14 LAW & INEQ. 73, log-Ii (1995) (examining the effect of race on Minnesota's transfer
statute). See generally Cynthia Conward, There Is No Justice, There Is "Just Us": A Look at
Overrepresentationof Minority Youth in the Juvenile Justice and CriminalJustice System, 4 WHrIT1ER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADvOC. 35 (2oo4) (discussing increasing trends to transfer children of color). But see

Jeffrey Fagan et al., Racial Determinants of the Judicial Transfer Decision: Prosecuting Violent Youth
in Criminal Court, 33 CRIME & DELINQ. 259, 276 (1987) (acknowledging racially disparate waiver rates
but concluding that "race effects disappeared when other variables were controlled").
309. 543 U.S. 551 (2oo5).
310. 987 SO. 2d 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2oo8), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (May 4, 2oo9) (No. o87621).
311. 982 So. 2d 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2oo8), cert granted, 129 S. Ct. 2157 (May 4, 2009) (No. o87412).
312. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000).
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